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ABSTRACT
This thesis summarizes the history of NBC warfare and
the NBC threat and policies exhibited by today's world powers
It analyzes the structure of NBC defense policies, training
and operations within the U.S. Marine Corps. It presents a
standardization proposal designed to remedy the existing
incongruities and establish a viable NBC defense program
for the Fleet Marine Force.
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I. NBC DEFENSE: A PERSPECTIVE FOR
TODAY'S FLEET MARINE FORCE
The United States, as a maritime nation, requires a strong
naval force to ensure its position as the leading power in
today's troubled world. In order to selectively project power
ashore in support of National Policy, we must maintain a strong
amphibious capability; this is provided by the U.S. Navy and
U.S. Marine Corps team. The role of the Marine Corps in meet-
ing our nation's future crises and conflicts is manifest in
Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) contingency planning. The Marine
Corps' ability to conduct operations on land, sea, and in the
air, coupled with its immediate responsiveness and unique
combined arms organization provides this nation's only forci-
ble entry capability from the sea. The missions and tasks
presently assigned to the Marine Corps transcend its tradi-
tional maritime role, officially recognizing its capabilities
as a ready force of combined arms, highly mobile and possessing
amphibious expertise.
During the decade commencing in 1962, Marine Corps opera-
tional involvement in the Republic of South Vietnam overshadowed
all other events. Subsequent to withdrawal from Southeast Asia
in 1972, the Marine Corps once again focused on amphibious
operations. The acquisition of the first LHA amphibious assault
shipping and the evolutionary refinement of sea-basing had
provided an impetus for returning to the basics of amphibious
operations. Although the most likely requirement for the
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employment of Marine forces in the immediate future appeared
to be in low- intensity wars, Marine Corps forces must be
necessarily structured with sufficient flexibility and fire-
power to participate effectively in mid- and high- intensity
conflicts, including possible nuclear exchange.
Redirecting primary emphasis from the Pacific, joint and
allied operations found the Marine Corps operating in Northern
Europe with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces
for the first time in 1972. Contingency plan requirements
long assigned to the Marine Corps but heretofore conducted
only on paper provided a familiarization with the terrain and
weather of Norway. During 1975, a Marine Amphibious Unit
(MAU) participated in Exercise "Straffe Zugel" with forces
of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1976, the question
of what the proper employment of the Marine Corps should be
in the NATO environment was once again raised. Should Marine
Corps units be deployed in central Europe with conventional
U.S. Army and NATO land forces, or should it be on the NATO
flanks where Marine Corps speed and versatility can be
employed? During the autumn of 1976. two joint/allied oper-
ations, "Teamwork 76" (Norway) and "Bonded Item" (Germany)
were conducted to assist in resolving this dilemma. Success-
ful performance in both operations lent credence to Marine
Corps employment in the familiar coastal environment of
either northern or southern Europe.
Regardless of the ultimate disposition of Fleet Marine
Forces (FMF) in Europe, the foe remains the same: the Union
11

of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and the six additional
Warsaw Pact countries. The premise that FMF conventional
operations can be successfully conducted in the NATO theater
is generally accepted by the military hierarchy. The intro-
duction of enemy nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare,
however, raises a serious and oft-debated question: "can the
FMF operate within an NBC environment?" The consensus of
Marines knowledgeable in the NBC defense field is a resounding
negative; not only is Marine Corps NBC defense capability
suspect, it is believed to be marginal, at best, under any
NBC conditions. If this allegation is factual, the Marine
Corps is placed at an extremely serious disadvantage requiring
immediate correction. The Warsaw Pact forces are known to be
extremely proficient in both offensive and defensive NBC oper-
ations and train against a background of nuclear and chemical
war.
The intent of this thesis is to closely examine Marine
Corps NBC philosophy, training, and operations, and present
a program to remedy existing NBC deficiencies. It will con-
centrate on the establishment of a standardized NBC defense
policy and training within the FMF to provide the capability
for successful NBC defense and NBC operations for the FMF
within an NBC environment.
12

II. THE NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREAT
A. HISTORY OF NBC WARFARE
The use of NBC weapons is an effective and powerful means
of conducting modern warfare. The selectivity afforded by
NBC weapons greatly expands the options of warfare that have
traditionally been limited to the size and strength of standing
conventional forces. Possession of NBC weapons is not only
viewed as critical to the guarantee of national well-being,
but is deemed prestigious to a country's national and world-
wide image. This is realistically reflected in the NBC
arsenals of the armed forces of today's modern nations. It
is commonly accepted that the advantages of NBC weapon pos-
session far outstrip the consequences of non-possession; the
large stockpiles of chemical weapons and the rush to join the
"nuclear club" emphasizes this quest.
Although the earliest use of chemical and biological war-
fare (CBW) is unclear, it is most probable that the initial
discovery of fire and its unique characteristics led to its
usage in repelling unfriendly animals and destroying unwanted
settlements. The first recorded history of chemical warfare
(CW) is documented in the Peloponnes ian War (431-404 B.C.)
when the Spartans burned sulphur- soaked rags to produce noxious
fumes in their wars with adjacent Greek city states. The
Macedonian Army, during the campaigns of Alexander the Great
(336-523 B.C.) catapulted diseased corpses over the protective
13

walls of besieged cities to register the first recorded use
of biological warfare (BW) . With these nocuous acts, CBW was
conceived, and subsequent scientific discovery and ingenuity
have transformed warfare over the centuries to its current
advanced state.
In the United States, BW was first employed in 1763 by the
British, when smallpox- infested blankets were distributed to
non- immune and highly susceptible members of hostile Indian
tribes during the French and Indian War. During the expansion
periods of our American West, diseased animals were often
deposited in water holes to restrict their use. Smoke was
employed during the Civil War by Confederate blockade runners
to conceal themselves from the Union Navy.
The synergistic trilogy of mass destruction, however,
was born during the twilight hours of 22 April 1915 at Ypres,
Belgium, amplified by two shattering nuclear blasts over Japan
in August of 1945, and culminated in the development of a
credible biological capability in the late 1950' s. Warfare
has not been, nor will it ever be, the same again.
The German action on 22 April 1915 is considered to be
the genesis of modern NBC warfare. The venting of some 6,000
chlorine cylinders in the salient near Ypres, and the subse-
quent drift of the noxious cloud over the French and British
trenches opened a four mile breach in the Allied line, causing
an estimated 15,000 casualties, of which approximately 5,000
were fatal. Throughout the remainder of World War I, both
factions employed a wide variety of lethal and incapacitating
14

chemical agents to circumvent improvements to existing chem-
ical protective equipment. Mustard gas was first used against
the British on 12 July 1917, causing 500 deaths and approxi-
mately 14,000 casualties, and was to become the single greatest
casualty producer of the war. Additionally, screening smoke
was used frequently and successfully on land and at sea by
both the Allied and Central powers throughout the war.
Only two instances of relatively large scale chemical
warfare have occurred since World War I. The first occurred
during the war between Italy and Abyssinia during 1935 and
1936, when Italy effectively used mustard gas to disperse and
defeat the enemy. The second use was during the first five
years of the war between Japan and China (1937 to 1942). The
Chinese government announced in June 1942 that no less than
1,000 gas attacks had been made by the Japanese against Chinese
troops in the previous five years of war. All were small scale
attacks and no critical appraisal of the effectiveness of these
attacks has ever been made.
The Germans discovered a new toxic chemical agent, tabun,
in 1956, which was the first of the nerve agents. The nerve
agent family is odorless, tasteless, and colorless, and conse-
quently impossible to detect with unaided senses. Entering
the body through the eyes, skin, or respiratory tract, they
act immediately, causing paralysis, prostration, and death,
even in minute quantities. Still acknowledged as the most
lethal of toxic chemical agents, for unknown reasons they
were never employed by the Germans. Possessing unparalleled
15

potential, it is quite fortunate for the Allies that Germany
did not exploit her advantage, particularly in light of the
effect a nerve agent attack might have had in Normandy on
D-Day.
During World War II, the use of flames, incendiaries, and
smoke fulfilled the CW needs necessary to accomplish national
objectives. Similar usage during the Korean conflict and the
recent engagement in Southeast Asia saw no expansion of CW,
with the exception of limited riot control agent (RCA) and
defoliant (herbicides) employment.
Scientists and military personnel maintained a general
interest in the application of BW, and this interest eventually
led to every major power possessing the technology and resources
to wage BW effectively by the 1950's.
The development of nuclear weapons provided the most
destructive and lethal weapons yet conceived by man. The
complete destruction of a large industrial city and a major
portion of its population by a single nuclear bomb is still
a feat to stagger the imagination. Yet, since the development
of the first nuclear weapon, an astronomical increase in indi-
vidual weapon yield has been realized. With strategic nuclear
warheads ranging up to 25 megatons, the approximate 13 kiloton
yield of the Hiroshima bomb appears miniscule indeed. Tactical
nuclear weapons and warheads currently number in the tens of
thousands. Five nations presently possess a nuclear warfare
capability. They are, by date of achievement, the United
States (1945), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1949),
16

Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and the Peoples' Republic
of China (1964). India detonated a nuclear explosive in 1974,
but is not believed to possess any nuclear warheads. The
recent distribution of nuclear reactors has placed numerous
nations within the immediate grasp of achieving a nuclear
capability. Looking to the immediate future, it is conceiv-
able that between 20 to 30 countries could possess tactical
nuclear weapons by the mid-1980' s.
B. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL POLICY
A review of international, Soviet, and United States NBC
policies will provide an insight to the major nationalistic
approaches to non-conventional warfare.
1 . International Policy
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war
of chemical and biological (CB) weapons. This has been the
definitive document on the control of chemical and biological
warfare. The Geneva Protocol did not, however, prohibit
development and stockpiling of CB weapons. Although the
United States never ratified the signing of the agreement,
it supported its intent in prohibiting the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological
warfare. The treaty was originally signed by representatives
of 38 nations on 17 June 1925, and a total of 84 nations are
parties to the treaty today. The United Nations Convention
of 26 March 1975, however, does prohibit the development,
stockpiling, and weaponizat ion of biological warfare agents.
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These prohibitions do not affect the use of research quantities
of these agents for maintaining an effective CBW protective
posture.
2. U.S.S.R. Policy
It is the accepted opinion among experts that Soviet
doctrine is to employ chemical weapons in tactical operations,
biological weapons in strategic operations, and nuclear weapons
as required. The Soviets consider CW as an integral part of
their overall offensive capability and chemical munitions are
available for these existing weapon systems: tactical missiles,
aircraft, surface-to-surface rockets, mortars, artillery,
generators, and mines. It is commonly accepted that if hos-
tilities were to erupt with the Soviets, they would willingly
employ offensive chemical weapons, which would most probably
be complicated by the use of both biological and nuclear
weapons
.
The U.S.S.R. acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for
the prohibition of wartime use of CBW agents with the reser-
vation that they would not be prohibited from CBW agent
employment against non-parties of the Protocol, violators
of the Protocol, or allies of the violators. As a result,
the U.S.S.R. was legally prohibited from the use of CBW agents
in certain instances but not from production or possession, a
point which was and continues to be repeatedly stressed in the
Soviet press.
The Soviets also have vociferously condemned those
countries which in the past have resorted to CBW, and their
18

sustained propaganda effort in this area can be assumed an
indicator of their considerable interest regarding CBW.
On the nuclear side, the fundamental premise of
current Soviet military doctrine envisages a strategic
package consisting of a superior first-strike counterforce
capability and effective attack and passive defenses to deal
with retaliatory attacks of the enemy's surviving strategic
forces, thus ensuring the complete defeat of any aggressor.
The Soviet position is that an effective, war-fighting,
war- survival , and war-winning capability also provides the
most credible form of deterrence. Military superiority is
needed to attain Soviet foreign policy objectives without
war with the West. Their doctrine emphasizes the primacy
of the offensive and enhanced importance of surprise in any
future war. Surprise is required for military success, and
a pre-emptive strike is of great strategic significance in
assuring the viability of the state.
The Soviets have a viable and effective CW defensive
policy that encompasses not only the military but their
civilian populace as well. Civil defense (CD) training is
conducted by their CD organization and entails 22 hours of
instruction plus practical exercises. Unlike American CD,
Soviet CD training is mandatory for all adults between the
ages of 16 and 60.
Goure, L. , "Soviet Military Doctrine," Air Force
Magazine
,




On 25 November 1969, then President Richard M. Nixon
set forth the U.S. policy on CW of "no-first-use" of lethal
chemical weapons and extended this policy to include incapac-
itating chemical agents as well. He also renounced all methods
of biological warfare and later extended this to include toxins
The U.S. has always adhered to the principles set forth in the
Geneva Protocol and had earlier renounced all forms of biolog-
ical warfare. It has reportedly destroyed all of its BW
stockpiles and has limited its research and development (R§D)
to a defensive status. However, the U.S., among other nations,
has found that her vital national interests require that she
enter reservations to the Geneva Protocol preserving the right
to retaliate with chemical weapons to a chemical attack. Thus,
the Geneva Protocol actually prohibits only the "first-use" of
the weapons it covers.
The overall object of the U.S. chemical policy is to
deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to
possess the capability to retaliate with chemical weapons
should deterrence fail. In the past, the use of chemical
weapons in war has been restrained by the threat of retalia-
tion in kind, and the U.S. believes that such a retaliatory
capability continues to serve as a deterrent today. The pres-
ent emphasis of the U.S. R§D program is to provide the capa-
bility to warn of, withstand, and recover from the effects of
a chemical attack against U.S. forces. Some strategists have
suggested that the U.S. abandon its retaliatory capability
20

and adopt a defensive only posture, relying upon its nuclear
deterrent to deter any chemical attack as well. This reliance
would risk lowering the nuclear threshold by denying an option
which falls between conventional munitions and escalation to
tactical nuclear weapons.
Present U.S. chemical programs are largely under
single component management by the U.S. Army, supported by
liaison offices of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy to meet
their specific requirements. The biological research program
is a totally defensive effort oriented primarily toward medical
research for the development of vaccines, prophylactic and
theraputic drugs, and other protective measures. Biological
detection and warning systems are being developed to alert
U.S. forces when such an attack occurs so proper protective
measures may be taken.
Authority for U.S. forces to engage in or retaliate
with lethal or incapacitating chemical and/or nuclear weapons
emanates from the President. This constraint, coupled with
total renunciation of biological warfare, the M no-f irst-use"
U.S. policy, and the parity of the U.S.S.R. in nuclear
weapons has made defense through deterrence no longer a
credible option.
C. U.S.S.R. AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
1 . History
The history of the development of Soviet CBW capa-
bilities has been shrouded in secrecy and obscured by the
passage of time. The Soviets have, however, published
21

information concerning concepts, organization, training and
material for BW defense and protection. Little definitive
information is available concerning CBW development within
the Soviet Union, and that available is predominantly of a
classified nature.
In May 1915, the Germans launched a chlorine attack
against Russian soldiers approximately 50 kilometers from
Warsaw, Poland. The Russians reportedly suffered 9,000 cas-
ualties, and Russian susceptibility to chemical attack con-
tinued throughout the war. The Russians suffered greater CW
casualties than any of the other belligerents, and this was
attributed to their poor "gas discipline," as they possessed
effective protective equipment. As a direct result of their
disastrous initial CW encounters, the Russians apparently
resolved to never again be placed in a similar position of
inadequacy. In 1925, the Soviets began construction of a
CBW proving ground at Tomka, where a highly classified joint
program with Germany was conducted from 1928 to 1933, at which
date the Soviets alone continued their research. The period
from 1918 to 1945 was characterized by construction of produc-
tion facilities for CBW agents and protective material. By
the end of World War II, Soviet technology had advanced to
such a state that Soviet forces were judged sufficiently
equipped and trained to wage large-scale CBW. Subsequent
CBW agent and weapon development continued with renewed vigor,
as the lack of a nuclear capability immediately following the
war provided a strong incentive to develop CBW as an alternative
22

while pursuing their nuclear program, which was realized in
1949.
The Soviet Armed Forces consists of five Soviet
Ministry of Defense combat services; they are (with the latest
manpower analysis estimate): Strategic Rocket Forces (375,000),
Ground Forces Cl> 82 5,000), Air Defense Forces (550,000), Air
Forces (490,000), and Navy (370,000). The Ministry of Defense,
Headquarters Staff, and various support troops total approxi-
mately 800,000, and Border Troops and Internal Security Troops
total 400,000 for an estimated total of 4,810,000 personnel.
Detailed comparison of U.S. and Soviet military manpower is
difficult due to our limited knowledge of many aspects of the
Soviet program. It is known that Soviet military forces are
used for such tasks as railroad repair, crop harvesting, and
construction. They apparently have proportionately fewer
civilians in their defense establishment, and many more mil-
itary directly involved in operating research and development
and production facilities. Their border and internal security
forces are not available for use outside the Soviet Union.
The U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and Rumania) rely upon conscription to provide the bulk of
their manpower. According to the latest information published
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the
Warsaw Pact armies have a combined strength of 2,626,000 men,
of whom some 900,000 are infantry. These figures do not take
account of Russia's 20,000 strong marine corps, of whom about
23

half could be considered as infantry. Poland also has a
1,000 man force of marines. As a comparison, the member
states of NATO and France have nearly 3,500,000 men in their
ground forces. Within Europe, however, the picture is pres-
2
ently one of Warsaw Pact superiority.
2. CBW
Soviet CBW training is realistic, well- structured and
stresses individual and unit technical proficiency. All per-
sonnel are taught individual protective measures (i.e., gas
mask, cape, and chemical agent identification kit use) and
disciplined to function for extended periods of time within
an NBC environment. Soviet Chemical Specialists currently
number over 80,000 and are trained in curricula lasting from
nine months to two years; officers reportedly receive even
more comprehensive training. Current Soviet CW training
emphasizes gas chamber exercises (GCX) , replacement of defec-
tive mask components in a contaminated atmosphere, and training
exercises with live, toxic chemical agents.
The Soviets, unlike the United States, have a large
and well-trained chemical organization. Chemical functions
within the Soviet Army are performed by separate chemical
units, which is in direct contrast to the U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps "functionalized" concept. Every Soviet division
has a unit devoted exclusively to CW and chemical troops are
Owen, J. I. H. , Major General, OBE, Warsaw Pact Infantry
and Its Weapons, p. 5, Western Press, 1976.
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assigned down to regimental level. Chemical personnel are
well-versed in chemical detection, identification, decontam-
ination procedures, and reconnaissance. By all indications,
the Soviets are very well prepared to use and defend against
CBW agents and weapons. The large quantities of Soviet CW
equipment captured during the 1973 Middle East War support
the supposition that they pose a serious CW threat.
The Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces continue to maintain a
superior capability to operate in toxic environments. They
are the best-equipped and prepared forces in the world to
employ chemical weapons and to operate under chemical, bio-
logical, and radiological (CBR) warfare conditions. Soviet
doctrine envisions CW employment in conjunction with either
conventional or nuclear weapons. Soviet front line commanders
have the capability to use CBW on a first strike basis against
NATO forces, and are increasing the number of combat and combat
support vehicles integrated with CBR collective protection
systems. Interwoven throughout the formidable Soviet effort
is the tenet that a viable CBR protective posture is prerequi-
site to NBC weapon employment. Additionally, all medical
support units train to care for the mass casualties expected
from NBC warfare.
Soviet leaders are currently pursuing a total ban on
the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical
weapons, but their military CW efforts continue unabated.
There is absolutely no evidence to suggest any lessening in
their effort to improve CBW training areas and equipment,
25

and new developments in CBR equipments are fielded at an
alarming rate.
3 . The Soviet Nuclear Threat
The presence of both the constructive and destructive
capabilities of nuclear forces has created new concepts of
warfare due to the peculiarities of nuclear weapon character-
istics and effects. Problem areas arise in defensive measures,
dispersion of tactical and supporting units, decontamination,
initial and residual radiation hazards, and massive medical
requirements. Offensively, to minimize casualties and pre-
clude unnecessary damage, extensive communications, coordina-
tion, control and planning are required. The evolution of
nuclear weaponry has provided increasingly complex and infin-
itely more devastating warheads to complement technological
advances in the fields of miniaturization, missilery, and
air/ground/sea delivery systems.
The nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
include warheads with yields ranging from a decimal percentage
of a kiloton up to 25 megatons. The most recent analysis of
U.S. /U. S. S .R. comparative nuclear might disclosed that the
U.S. leads the U.S.S.R. in strategic nuclear warheads by 8,350
to 3,250 but the U.S.S.R. has a 20 percent edge in the number
of delivery vehicles and planes. The U.S.S.R. also outweighs
the U.S. in throw-weight by 3,735 to 1,930 megatons and in the
total destructive force of Soviet missile-borne nuclear devices.
3
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance, 1976-1977
,
paper quoted by The Monterey
Peninsula Herald, p. 1, 4 September 1976.
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America's monopoly of nuclear weapons ended in 1949
with the first Soviet nuclear detonation. The period of
nuclear monopoly (1945-1953) by the U.S. provided a deterrent
to a possible Soviet attack on Western Europe during this
period. From 1954 to 1960, the American threat of massive
retaliation provided an explicit strategy of deterrence aimed
at both local and limited as well as general wars. The U.S.
military was directed by the Executive Branch to plan to use
nuclear weapons whenever their use was militarily desirable.
By being able to employ nuclear weapons of a wide range of
magnitude in a wide range of situations, U.S. armed forces
would not need to demand large masses of manpower or immense
varieties of conventional arms, thus reducing defense expend-
itures. Only when the Soviets achieved significant missile
successes in the fall of 1957 with the first Sputnik launch
was an awareness of their capabilities brought to the attention
of the American public. In 1958, suspicion of a so-called
"missile gap" between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. accelerated pro-
duction of U.S. warheads and placed the U.S. in an even
stronger role due to the error in the prediction of actual
Soviet gains. With President Kennedy's election in 1960, the
transition from a strategy of massive retaliation to that of
flexible response began. Along with Secretary of Defense
McNamara and his staff of controversial "whiz kids," President
Kennedy effectively confronted the Soviets during their ill-
fated attempt to emplace Soviet intermediate range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis
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of 1961. The much- debated missile gap mysteriously evaporated
with reassessment of the relative nuclear strength of the two
superpowers. Russia increased their nuclear warhead production
to ensure that they would be able to deal from a position of
strength in any future confrontation with the U.S. A notice-
able shift from the U.S. doctrine of nuclear superiority was
necessitated by the realization that the U.S. would be unable
to destroy Russia's second strike force to such an extent that
the U.S. would be able to escape damage in a nuclear war. It
became apparent that even though the U.S. enjoyed a meaningful
strategic nuclear superiority, Soviet expansion would lead to
corresponding U.S. endeavors to maintain a continued lead.
With President Nixon's administration, the current U.S.
strategic goal of sufficiency and its military strategy of
realistic deterrence began. The Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT I, 1969-1972, and SALT II, 1972-1974) culminated
in the Vladivostock Accord of 24 November 1974, which is to
cover arms controls during the period from October 1977 through
31 December 1985. This strategy was forced by the achievement
of the Soviets in overcoming the once superior intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) force and matching technology in sea-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) . The current Soviet
strategic threat is well documented and a source of constant
concern for all mankind.
The current policy of U. S
.
/U. S. S. R. detente has served
well the Soviet cause, enabling them to pursue their objective
of a massive ICBM fleet which presently numbers over 1500

missiles, constantly undergoing further modernization at a
furious rate. Soviet missile silos are also being hardened
to about 3,000 psi, more than twice the hardness of new U.S.
Minuteman III silos. Approximately 85 percent of the Soviet
defense budget in the past decade has gone to forces which
constitute a direct threat to the U.S. and its European allies;
that is, strategic nuclear forces and the forces deployed
4
opposite NATO. At the present time, given existing Soviet
ICBM accuracy, more than three-quarters of the USAF's ICBMs
would survive a Soviet sneak attack. It is hypothesized that
by the mid 1980' s, that fraction might be down to as few as
one-fourth, according to USAF Secretary Reed.
The possession and distribution of tactical nuclear
weapons within both U.S. and U.S.S.R. armed forces is an
integral part of each nation's capability to wage nuclear
warfare. The propensity to employ tactical nuclear weapons
carries the risk of escalation towards a strategic encounter,
and creates the most serious disadvantage to tactical nuclear
weapon employment. This controversial aspect could lead to
tactical nuclear weapon restraint, which would in all proba-
bility prove detrimental to the defense of numerically inferior
conventional forces, specifically NATO forces in Central Europe,
who are opposed by superior Soviet firepower, manpower, and
mobility.
4 Ulsamer, E. , "The U.S.S.R, f s Military Shadow is
Lengthening," Air Force Magazine , v. 60, n. 3, p. 37, March 1977
29

SALT negotiations covering the questions of further
limitations and reduction of strategic arms in the period
after 1985 will be confronted by such developments as the
neutron bomb, the cruise missile, and mobile ICBMs, of which
the latter two both offer a viable, land-based alternative to
more expensive and vulnerable fixed missile silos. Meanwhile,
the production of both strategic and tactical nuclear warheads
and weapons continues on both sides. The threat of a potential
nuclear exchange has led to wide concern regarding the control
of nuclear weapons. Alistair Cooke philosophized, "The
greatest danger is that the technology of the unthinkable war
will enchant its practitioners, growing so subtle and mighty
as to acquire a momentum all of its own, which mere men will
be powerless to subdue."
4 . Civil Defense
The Soviets accuse the West of denying the feasibility
of victory in a nuclear war, and view this outlook as erroneous
and harmful. The Soviet view of the relationship between
strategic offensive and defensive systems is that while the
Soviet Armed Forces destroy or intercept attack weapons, Civil
Defense, by carrying out protective measures and the thorough
preparation of the Soviet population will achieve the maximum
weakening of the destructive effects of modern weapons.
The Soviet CD program threatens to destabilize existing
U . S . — U. S . S . R. strategic relationships for the following
reasons
:
Cooke, A., Alistair Cooke's America
,
p. 363, Knopf, 1973
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a. Russia may perceive an ability to absorb at a
limited cost a retaliatory U.S. strike. The stability that
now exists may be undermined as Russia decides she can afford
to fire the first salvo.
b. Russia can absorb a U.S. first strike, when and
if the U.S. renounces its existing policy of "no- first- strike .
"
The current permanent Russian CD program staff numbers
72,000 members, the majority of whom are military personnel.
The 15 Soviet Republics are assigned CD commanders holding the
rank of either major or lieutenant general. Active duty
officers also command the approximately 120 government CD
centers that comprise the 15 Republic CD regions. The perma-
nent CD staff is to be augmented by the 500,000 member Soviet
police force in the event of national crisis.
Russian CD preparation begins with urban planning.
Building density has been reduced via dispersion to improve
overall national industry survivability. These urban plans
provide for green belts and wide thoroughfares to serve as
firebreaks and immediate clearing of radiation-free passages
following a nuclear exchange. This would immediately reduce
the hazard of induced radiation to the wholesale evacuation
of protected personnel surviving the holocaust. The Russian
plan provides urban assembly areas for each 2,000 to 3,000
urban dwellers. These assembly areas are also permanently
staffed; when an evacuation is ordered, movement to the
assembly area is followed by convoy, train, or water trans-
portation to an evacuation area (with some transportation being
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accomplished by marching, if the distance is reasonable).
The evacuation areas are located on collective farms, all
of which are prepared for the evacuees by number and even
by name. Construction of simple shelters will be commenced
immediately, which is anticipated to require about 11 hours
to construct a 10-man shelter with a blast resistance of 30
to 50 psi and a radiation protection factor of about 1,000
radiation absorbed dose (rad) . Recent intelligence indicates
that the Soviet CD troops are listed on a par with the other
five Soviet military services which provides an insight as
to their national policy towards the overall CD posture and
its role in strategic strategy and planning.
U.S. calculations of Soviet fatalities in a strategic
exchange are based on an assumption that Russian citizens will
occupy their urban areas at the time of the exchange. This,
obviously, is not the Russian plan; they intend to evacuate
and disperse prior to the onset of hostilities, implying that
the Soviet government may have an idea of when the hostilities
will commence.
D. THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA
General information concerning the Peoples' Republic of
China (PRC) is scarce and military information of any conse-
quence is very broad, often vague, and usually classified.
Consequently, the majority of information currently available
is mainly supposition and subject to debate. As a result of
this void, the appraisal of the threat and capabilities of the
PRC is primarily the opinion of the authors and is considered
secondary as compared to the Soviet threat.
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Due to a shortage of qualified scientists and technicians
and a limited research and development program, the evolution
of the PRC NBC offensive and defensive structure is based on
the interchange of technology prior to the Sino-Soviet split.
Driven by their national goal of the attainment of world power
status and witnessing the Soviet advances and emphasis in the
NBC field, the PRC intensified their NBC programs. This has
been accomplished as a result of their exploitation of foreign
scientific and technological advances.
All evidence indicates that the Chinese NBC employment
doctrine is quite similar to Soviet doctrine in both offensive
and defensive operations. The primary emphasis appears to be
oriented to such defensive aspects as CW reconnaissance, rapid
detection, and agent identification. The PRC has developed a
credible IRBM force with a regional nuclear strike capability;
at this time it is estimated that between 60 and 70 IRBMs are
capable of striking well into U.S.S.R. territory from their
western China locations.
It is important to note that the PRC is a non- s ignatory
to both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological War-
fare Convention. While both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., as signees,
could be reducing or terminating CBW production, the PRC could
be continuing research, development and production of CBW
weapons. The present PRC posture indicates that their main
interest lies in the role of deterrence and defense against
the Soviets. This should not be construed to negate any
possible threat to the continental U.S., but only that the
threat is not yet immediate.
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III. U.S. ARMY TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND
United States Armed Forces doctrine has established that
the Department of the Army (DA) is totally responsible for the
CW munitions, agents, and CB defensive items that meet joint
requirements of both the U.S. Army and either the U.S. Navy
or the U.S. Air Force, or both. The U.S. Army is charged with
the primary responsibilities on land except for those functions
otherwise assigned by the JCS . The Marine Corps, on the other
hand, is responsible for CW and biological defense operations
related only to its assigned functions, including defense
against enemy CB weapons.
Due to the U.S. Army's major role in NBC defense, the
Marine Corps relies heavily upon the doctrines, equipment,
and training devices developed by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.
As a result of this near total reliance, it is postulated that
any analysis or study completed by the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the field of NBC defense is
directly applicable, either in whole or in part, to the Marine
Corps
.
The U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School (USAOC§S)
,
Aberdeen, Maryland, has recently completed a study examining
the effectiveness of unit NBC defense officer and NCO training
and the current capabilities of NBC personnel to adequately
perform their additional duty NBC assignments. Their analysis
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was supported by field testing at 12 CONUS U.S. Army NBC
schools, with their primary intent being to determine the
skill levels and current NBC knowledge retained by previ-
ously trained NBC personnel. It was noted that NBC training
effectiveness at the company level is directly related to
command acceptance and support for unit NBC defense training
and to the effectiveness of training provided to unit NBC
defense officers and NCO's. A lack of command interest and
less than optimum NBC training emphasis will result in poor
unit NBC readiness and a much reduced posture for unit mission
accomplishment within an NBC environment. The best trained
unit NBC personnel will be ineffective without this accept-
ance and support. To further emphasize the need for training,
personnel were tested who had completed an area NBC school
course within the previous six months and who had not parti-
cipated in or conducted proficiency tests. Final test results
disclosed a failure rate of 70 percent. This is contrasted
with the testing of personnel who had accomplished this
training during the same period after completing school,
resulting in only approximately 30 percent failures. These
astonishing test results and corresponding effectiveness levels
prompted the U.S. Army to delve into and to examine the entire
spectrum of their NBC defense program.
United States Army Ordnance Center and School, Training





The training effectiveness analysis is extremely compre-
hensive, covering practically every facet of applicability
within the U.S. Army. Only those sections of the report
which exhibited a direct correlation to the Marine Corps NBC
program were explored.
B. SUMMARY OF THE TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS PLAN
1. Problem
Recent training surveys have indicated that current
defense readiness in U.S. Army units is extremely poor. The
desired effectiveness of NBC training at the company level is
directly related to the effectiveness of training provided to
unit NBC officers and NCO's by NBC schools. Therefore, an
analysis had to be completed to determine the manner in which
to obtain the maximum benefit from the training investment.
2. Impact of the Problem
The military preparedness of the U.S.S.R. and the
Warsaw Pact countries is such that the United States will not
be able to afford the luxury of anything less than maximum
NBC defense proficiency in Army units. Therefore, any NBC
training less than optimum will result in wasted resources
and degraded unit readiness.
3. Obj ectives
a. Define the required level of NBC proficiency
required of school trained NBC officers and NCO's.
b. Determine the requirements for changes and




c. Determine the most effective method of instruction
for teaching unit NBC officers and NCO * s
.
d. Determine the optimum usage of training simulators
and devices.
e. Develop alternative training readiness recommenda-
tions .
f. Analyze and compare effectiveness and cost of
current and alternative training recommendations.
g. Determine if periodic refresher training for




Training methods, techniques, and results of NBC
training received by unit NBC officers and NCO ' s will be
studied. Current training practices, constraints, and phil-
osophy will be examined in an attempt to identify areas where
innovative training techniques can produce results which
enhance unit proficiency in NBC defense.
5 Limits
a. The analysis will be limited to examination of
the training for which the USAOC§S is proponent.
b. The analysis will not include those aspects of NBC
defense training for individual, team, and unit proficiency,
except as they impact on the training requirements for unit
NBC officers and NCO ' s
.
c. Factors which impact on the employment and use of




a. Current fiscal constraints will continue and will
require even greater effectiveness from training resources.
b. The international political environment will
remain such that NBC defense in the U.S. Army will continue
to be essential.
c. Unit training programs will continue to emphasize
NBC defense training and properly utilize school trained




Essential Elements of Analysis
a. Based on current standards, what skills are
necessary for the unit NBC officers and NCO's to achieve?
b. Is the present POI for area NBC schools adequate
to achieve intended results?
c. What is the most effective method to conduct unit
NBC officer and NCO training?
d. How can currently available training simulators,
aids, and simulant agents be most effectively used by NBC
officers and NCO's?
e. What is the current effectiveness of the NBC
school trained unit NBC officers and NCO's for implementing
NBC training in the unit?
f. Is periodic refresher training for unit NBC
officers and NCO's necessary, and if so, what is the optimum
frequency and subject matter for this training?
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g. What are the factors that affect the mission





a. The recommended training changes must be training
and cost effective.
b. The analysis will be conducted and funded with
existing TRADOC resources.
9 Basic Alternatives
a. Do not make any changes to existing training.
b. Only make moderate modifications of existing
training.
c. Make a complete revision of existing training.
10 . Measures of Training Effectiveness (MOTE)
The MOTE will be the identification and knowledge of
the critical tasks and skills that must be performed by school
trained personnel that will enable them to perform their duties
in support of the commander's responsibilities.
C. FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION TEAM
1. Since the functions of NBC defense officers and NCO's
in the majority of units are performed as an additional duty,
the personnel serving in these adjunct positions must develop
the skills required to function in this capacity in addition
to the skills of their primary duty assignment. In order to
determine what the graduate of an area NBC school was expected
to do and know, a job analysis was conducted. This resulted
in a skill/task inventory (Appendix A) which when once mastered
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would enable the NBC defense personnel to perform their duties
in support of the commander's responsibilities. A new POI
was proposed and designed to afford unit NBC personnel optimum
training and less time lost to mission training.
2. The current area NBC school POI ' s require revision to
ensure that the essential skills and tasks are taught to unit
NBC defense officers and NCO ' s . The two alternatives considered
were
:
a. Use the present POI.
b. Reduce the course length by 30 percent in conjunc-
tion with a new POI
.
An experimental group of 35 enlisted and 20 officers
was tested by written examination at the completion of the
reduced block of instruction. The percentage of individuals
correctly responding to each question was recorded and then
compared with historical data from the same written examination
(Tables I and II). A statistical analysis (Appendix B) was
then completed and it was found that the means of both sets
of test scores were equal. It was therefore concluded that
a reduction in the course of instruction by 30% (from 10 to
7 instructional days) and a similar reduction in cost (Appendix
C) can be effected with no significant degradation in training
effectiveness through the adoption of the proposed alternative.
3. The effective use of training simulators, aids, and
simulant agents can only be accomplished through careful
planning on the part of the unit NBC officer and NCO. This
planning and use will result in helping the commander fulfill
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his responsibility for ensuring that his unit and its per-
sonnel can meet the objectives of surviving an NBC attack,
operating in an NBC environment, and maintaining maximum
mission effectiveness.
4. It was determined by the evaluation team that based
on testing of a limited population (205 officers and enlisted
men) the graduates of area NBC schools, as a group, do not
retain a level of competence necessary for accomplishing
their additional duty assignments in their units (60% of this
sample group failed the proficiency test) . This is directly
correlated with the elapsed time after completing an area NBC
school in conjunction with the lack of opportunity to exercise
those skills acquired.
5. Tabulated test score data shows that the majority
of area NBC school graduates achieve grades of 80% or better.
This would tend to indicate that these graduates would be
capable of performing the associated NBC duties in their
units. Questionnaires indicated that 83% of the graduates
had absolutely no refresher training, 58% reported that their
unit gave little or no emphasis to NBC training, 84% had not
given or participated in an NBC proficiency test, and only
8% of the units strongly emphasized NBC training.
NBC written test results correlated with unit NBC
training emphasis plotted against elapsed time (Appendix D)
showed once again that the emphasis placed on NBC training at
the company level is directly proportional to the proficiency
retained by unit NBC defense officers and NCO ' s in a given
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skill area. The commander must ensure that unit NBC personnel
retain their training and operational qualifications. This
can be most efficiently accomplished by having NBC school
trained personnel undergo refresher training in the technical
aspects of NBC defense between four to six months after com-
pleting a prescribed course of instruction.
6. The overall effectiveness of area NBC schools is
directly proportional to the guidance and staff support given
to the school by the intermediate supervisory elements of the
command element under which it functions. Lack of training
facilities, equipment shortages, and inadequate staffing of
area NBC schools are all related factors that impact on the
overall effectiveness of the training received by unit NBC
defense personnel and their ability for improving unit NBC
defense readiness.
D. CRITIQUE AND APPLICABILITY TO THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
The analysis uncovered a very real and potentially danger-
ous situation. The United States is not prepared to operate
according to satisfactory standards in an NBC environment.
Commanders are failing to exercise their responsibility for
NBC defense readiness and the effects are being demonstrated
in the performance of their men. The analysis shows in a
direct manner that the current system is weak and in need of
change, direction, and command attention. The U.S. Army is
the "leader" in the field of NBC defense. Where does this
leave the Marine Corps? The structure, training, organization




Question Historical Experimental Difference
1 70 71 + 1
2 79 48 -31
3 49 60 + 11
4 42 48 + 6
5 65 58 - 7
6 95 94 - 1
7 95 97 + 2
8 90 83 - 7
9 100 100
10 95 97 + 2
11 95 94 - 1
12 92 91 - 1
13 77 80 + 5
14 98 100 + 2
15 95 94 - 1
16 95 94 - 1
17 95 82 -13
18 87 68 -19
19 84 63 -21
20 75 72 - 3
21 85 83 - 2
22 100 97 - 3
23 80 69 -11
24 95 100 + 5
25 91 95 + 4
26 100 89 -11
27 99 100 + 1
28 49 47 - 2
29 84 92 + 8
Table I r Enlisted NBC Test Scores
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Question Historical Exp erimental Difference
1 75 62 -13
2 89 67 -22
3 95 95
4 100 95 - 5
5 100 100
6 98 100 + 2
7 100 95 - 5
8 100 100
9 98 90 - 8
10 95 100 + 5




15 60 76 + 16
16 100 86 -14
17 100 100
18 80 100 + 20
19 50 90 + 40
20 90 86 - 4
21 100 100
22 82 70 -12
23 100 100




28 100 90 -10
Table II - Officer NBC Test Scores
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IV. NBC DEFENSE IN THE FLEET MARINE FORCE
A. STRUCTURE OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCE
"If we expect diplomatic efforts to be effective, we
must maintain a capability to defend these interests when-
ever and wherever necessary. Yet we cannot maintain pre-
positioned forces in every potential overseas crisis area.
.
.
This is the principal reason why the United States has a
continuing need for its Fleet Marine Forces - instantly
ready and highly mobile - to provide the nation's only
major capability of forcible entry. The need for this
capability in crisis management is fundamental."
General Louis H. Wilson
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Public Law 416, 82nd Congress established the force
structure of the Marine Corps at not less than three combat
divisions and three air wings, with other land combat, avia-
tion, and other services as may be organic therein. The Fleet
Marine Force constitutes the General Purpose Forces of the
Marine Corps assigned to the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy,
and are organized, trained, and equipped for service with the
Fleets in seizure and defense of advanced bases; for land
operations related to naval campaigns; development of amphib-
ious tactics, technique, and equipment; training the maximum
number of Marines for war or emergency expansion; and immediate
expeditionary service where, when, and as directed.
Working directly for the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, the Fleet Marine Force is struc-
tured into two major commands, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(FMFLANT) , and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) , respec-
tively. Further subdivision into three Marine Divisions
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(MARDIV) , three Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW), and two Force
Troops (FORTPS) organizations provides the basic organiza-
tional structure for the approximately 110,000 Marines
assigned to the Fleet Marine Force. Respective Headquarters
are presently located in the following geographical locations
as depicted in Figure 1.
The Fleet Marine Force is required to maintain a satis-
factory state of readiness to engage in low, medium, and high
intensity war, to meet standing commitments for deployments,
and to execute various contingency plans. The aggregation of
Fleet Marine Forces into self-sufficient and self-sustaining
forces is accomplished upon directions from the Commanding
General of either FMFLANT or FMFPAC. During actual operations
ground and aviation elements remain divided into their distinct
and respective commands but are controlled by temporary ad hoc
headquarters, which are generated when a specific commitment
of forces is required. Organization into a Marine Amphibious
Force (MAF , comprised of one or more divisions, aircraft wings,
and Force Troop organizations) , a Marine Amphibious Brigade
(MAB, comprised of an infantry regiment, composite aviation
group, and Force Troops elements), or a Marine Amphibious Unit
(MAU , comprised of an infantry battalion, composite aviation
squadron, and Force Troops elements) is accomplished using
existing forces under designated commanders. Such units are
task organized to meet the requirements of each assigned
contingency or task and to fulfill mission accomplishment
within the initial employment, with follow-on logistical
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support, if required, arriving within a specified time period.
An increasing number of Marines will see service with the FMF
in future years as the ratio of combat forces to support forces
increases. The FMF is presently functioning at a manning level
CM/L) considerably below the strength authorized by tables of
organization (T/0) for the three division/wing teams. Head-
quarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) opines that a Corps of 212,000
Marines is necessary to maintain three division/wing teams
with a full range of combat capability. Today's Marine Corps
falls somewhat short, with a 191,500 personnel strength auth-
orized for Fiscal Year 1978. Current Marine Corps manpower
requirements project the following Fleet Marine Force levels
in Fiscal Years 1977, 1978, and 1979.





Total 108.0 110.1 111.6
The concentrating of strength where the greatest threat
exists and task organizing, equipping, and positioning of
Fleet Marine Forces in the most effective manner will permit
the Marine Corps to continue to support its three division/
wing teams and perform its missions.
79.8 80. 3 81.9
27.7 29.3 29.2
. 5 . 5 . 5
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B. NBC DEFENSE ORGANIZATION IN THE FLEET MARINE FORCE
By doctrine, Fleet Marine Force organizations are organized,
equipped, and trained to fight in nuclear warfare, non-nuclear
warfare, and under the threat of nuclear warfare. Additionally,
the Marine Corps is responsible for chemical operations related
to its assigned functions, including defense against enemy
chemical and biological weapons. Inherent in Fleet Marine
Force missions are the provisions for individual and organi-
zation protection from nuclear, radiological, biological and
chemical attack.
The Marine Corps NBC defense program was established in
1953 as the Atomic, Biological and Chemical (ABC) defense
program, and later redesignated the Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical (NBC) defense program. Marine Corps Tables of
Organizations (T/O's) were written to include NBC Defense
Specialists (military occupational specialty (MOS) 5711) at
battalion and squadron levels, NBC Defense Officers (MOS 5702)
at regimental and Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) levels, and
additional billets as determined necessary within supporting
organizations. NBC defense schools were established at
Division, Force Troops, and Marine Aircraft Wing commands,
using lesson plans written by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps,
with only that information applicable to Marine Corps equip-
ment, policy, and tactics extracted for presentation.
The NBC Defense Specialist, usually a Corporal or Sergeant,
is located in the S-3 Section (Operations/Training) of the
battalion or squadron. He is tasked with maintaining his
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organization's NBC defense equipment, training its Marines
in NBC defense measures and protection, and, in coordination
with the NBC Defense Officer, advising the Commander on all
NBC defense matters. All Fleet Marine Force organizations
without an NBC Defense Specialist are required to assign one
officer and appropriated enlisted assistants to NBC defense
duties on an additional duty basis. The number of Marines
thus assigned to NBC defense duties increases greatly at
battalion and squadron level, as Control Center, Decontamin-
ation, and Monitor/Survey teams are required by NBC defense
standing operating procedures (SOP's) within individual com-
mands. During active NBC warfare, additional NBC trained
personnel will be required to meet battalion/squadron and
regimental requirements.
SOP's designate organization, equipment, and functions of
unit control center, decontamination, and monitor/survey teams.
An organization Control Center Team, comprised of the NBC
Defense Officer and NBC Defense Specialist, and three enlisted
assistants (computer, recorder, and plotter) will be available
to coordinate all NBC defense team activity and advise the
commander on NBC defense matters. Control Center Teams are
located at both battalion/squadron and regiment/group levels.
A Decontamination Team, normally comprised of a non-commissioned
officer and nine enlisted assistants, will be trained to provide
an equipment and personnel decontaminating capability. Monitor/
Survey teams are established on the basis of Table of Equipment
(T/E) radiac instruments and chemical agent detector kits held
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by each respective organization. A primary and secondary
operator are normally required for each instrument/kit,
with drivers, radio operators, and security personnel being
provided as necessary. Monitor/ Survey teams provide the
capability of detecting any known chemical agent, taking
biological samples, conducting ground and aerial radiological
surveys, and assisting in calculations required in determining
organizational NBC defense decisions.
At the present time, there is no provision providing for
the establishment of the above teams other than local direc-
tives; they must additionally provide their own training once
they are organized, and this is normally accomplished in coor-




NBC Defense Billet Descriptions
MOS requirements which presently exist within Marine
Corps Occupational Field (OF) 57: Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical, are extracted from the Marine Corps MOS Manual and
presented in Appendix E. MOS 5702 and MOS 5711 provide the
foundation for the NBC defense program within each organization
and will be discussed in detail in future sections.
2. NBC Defense Personnel
a. OF 57 Distribution
Table III provides current OF 57 personnel assets,
officer and enlisted, for the Marine Corps and those assigned
to the Fleet Marine Force. Of the officers, 71 hold MOS 5702
as their first additional MOS and 43 hold it as their second
50

additional MOS, The only officers eligible to hold a primary
MOS 5702 are Warrant Officers; all other officers hold MOS
57Q2 as an additional MOS. Enlisted Marines hold MOS 5711
as a primary MOS, but are utilized to fill other billets as
determined by their respective commands.
An examination of both the officer and enlisted
grade distribution discloses a shortage of trained personnel
in the officer company grade ranks and the lower enlisted
grades. The large number of field grade officers and staff
non-commissioned officers holding MOS 5702 and MOS 5711,
respectively, lends credence to the claim that the NBC defense
field has received decreased emphasis in recent years. This
evidence is reflected in the one Marine Corps and five Fleet
Marine Force MOS 5702 primary billets; each of which specifies
a company grade officer. Current officer and enlisted NBC
defense assets are not aligned to existing T/O requirements.
This creates a serious continuity problem to staffing T/O
billets with the level of expertise and experience desired.
Battalion and Squadron NBC Defense Officer billets require
Warrant Officers (WO-1) through Captains (0-3) for the officer
assignments. Enlisted NBC Defense Specialist billets require
Sergeants (E-5) at the battalion level and Corporals (E-4) at
the squadron level.
For the NBC Defense Officers, whether serving in
a primary or a secondary NBC defense billet, advancement to
field grade usually terminates that individual's active in-
volvement in any directly-related NBC defense work. There
are six Major (0-4) secondary billets and one Lieutenant

Colonel (0-5) secondary billet presently in the Fleet Marine
Force. NBC Defense Specialist billets exist only for the
grades of Corporal (E-4) through Master Sergeant (E-8).
b. OF 57 Billet Requirements and Utilization
Table IV provides OF 57 billet requirements and
current manning within Fleet Marine Force organizations as
of 25 May 1977. There are five MOS 5702 primary billets and
249 MOS 5711 primary billets within the Fleet Marine Force.
Of the five officer billets, only one is manned by a MOS 5702
officer. Although only five MOS 5702 primary billets exist,
every company- sized unit has the requirement that an officer
be assigned NBC defense duties on a collateral-duty basis.
It is presently impossible, given available officer assignment
data, to determine actual utilization of the remaining MOS 5702
officers presently assigned to the Fleet Marine Force; it is
envisioned, however, that they are assigned NBC defense
collateral duties consistent with sound officer assignment
policy within each organization. With 249 MOS 5711 billets
existing in the FMF and only 190 MOS 5711 Marines presently
assigned to MOS 5711 billets, a 69-man shortage currently
exists. This corresponds to a 76.3% manning level for NBC
Defense Specialists.
C. NBC DEFENSE ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES
1, MCO 5400.5
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3400.3 is the primary NBC
defense order for all Marine organizations. This order prom-
ulgates NBC defense readiness and training requirements, and
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specifies a mandatory requirement for all commands to develop
and maintain effective operating procedures, necessary support-
ing directives, and a high state of training to minimize
reduction in mission effectiveness resulting from an NBC
attack. This order specifically requires that all commanders:
a. Maintain a capability to defend against the
employment of NBC weapons.
b. Ensure training of every Marine in individual
protective measures.
c. Organize NBC defense capabilities with necessary
personnel and equipment down to company/battery level for
ground units and squadron level for aviation units.
d. In selection/assignment of NBC defense specialist
personnel, (1) assign, for units not provided with NBC defense
T/0 billets, one officer and appropriate enlisted assistants
to NBC defense duties on an additional duty basis, and (2)
ensure that personnel assigned to additional duty NBC defense
billets are graduates of a division- level NBC defense school
or its equivalent.
e. Develop proficiency tests to determine their unit's
degree of proficiency.
f. Ensure that individual and unit NBC equipment and
associated supplies are maintained in a high state of material
readiness
.
FMF Commanders will also:





h. Integrate NBC defense training with field training
exercises whenever possible.
The attainment of individual and unit NBC defense
proficiency and readiness is further guided by procedures
in three U.S. Array Field Manuals (FM) :
FM 21- 4Q ; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Defense :
FM 21-41 ; Soldier's Handbook for Defense against Chemical
and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare ;
FM 21-48 ; Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR)
and Nuclear Defense Training Exercises.
2. MCO 1510.2
Marine Corps Order 1510.2 provides a program for the
Individual Training of Enlisted Marines (ITEM) . The purpose
of the ITEM program is to develop skilled forces- in-readiness
to carry out any assigned mission through a training program
encompassing those essential subjects prescribed by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). Essential subject
training and subsequent essential subject training evaluation
are provided to ensure that enlisted Marines in the rank of
Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) and below maintain proficiency in the
following essential subjects:
Code of Conduct and Military Law/Uniform Code of
Military Justice
History, Customs, and Courtesies
Close Order Drill
Interior Guard
First Aid and Field Sanitation
Uniform Clothing and Equipment
Physical Fitness.
NBC Defense
Service Rifle and Marksmanship*
Individual Tactical Measures*
^(Applicable to enlisted men only; all other subjects
applicable to both enlisted men and women)
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Written examinations are administered on an annual
basis to determine individual deficiencies. Failure to meet
established minimum passing scores on each test necessitates
attendance at essential subject training classes for all
subjects not passed. The "test before training approach"
thus enables limited training resources to be used in the
most efficient manner. Retesting is required in each subject
after additional instruction is provided until a passing score
is obtained.
Evaluation of essential subject training is oriented
towards practical application and implementation of techniques
instructed in classes and field exercises. Essential subject
performance objectives are specified in enclosure (3) to the
basic order for each essential subject. An examination of the
NBC defense performance objectives discloses a field-oriented
approach to individual NBC defense measures and protection.
Present NBC defense performance objectives are:
a. Remove, don, seat, clear and check the Field
Protective Mask within nine seconds (15 seconds if the M6A2
protective mask hood is attached)
.
b. Mask and cover body with poncho within 20 seconds.
c. Move through a contaminated area with minimum
contact.
d. Drop on stomach, close eyes, protect hands, neck
and face from a simulated nuclear blast.
e. Take cover in a shelter and crouch/lay back in
direction of bias t- -remain until 90 seconds have passed.
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f. Fire ten rounds with the service rifle with 60%
first round hits, at distances up to 457 meters, while wearing
the Field Protective Mask (on an annual basis)
.
Practical testing of essential subjects' proficiency
is used to determine the extent to which academic training
can be implemented into usable knowledge to ensure surviva-
bility under NBC defense conditions. In the area of NBC
defense testing and evaluation, a total familiarization with
individual protective NBC defense equipment and protection
measures is required for successful test completion.
3. MCO P1500.17
Marine Corps Order P1500.17 concerns Fleet Marine
Force unit training and provides training objectives which
are recommended for incorporation into unit mission, integrated,
concurrent, special, and reserve training. The following con-
siderations are provided as appropriate in the development of
concurrent NBC defense training objectives into mission-oriented
training exercises:
a. The enemy's capabilities in employment of nuclear
and chemical munitions.
b. Tactical proficiency of units in detecting the
presence of chemical agents and the subsequent warning actions.
c. Proficiency of units in assuming a chemical defense
posture (i.e., rapid employment of protective masks, rapid
dressing in protective clothing)
.
d. Proficiency of units in conducting combat opera-
tions while wearing protective clothing and masks.
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e. Proficiency of unit monitoring and decontamin-
ation teams.
4. MCO 3400.4
Marine Corps Order 3400.4 concerns the dissemination
of U.S. Army Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 3-7-2, "Things to Do
Under Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Attack." This is a
small, pocket-sized publication which provides the individual
Marine general guidance when operating within an NBC environ-
ment.
5. MCO 5711.36
Marine Corps Order 5711.36 contains the organization
and standards for NBC defense as applied to NATO forces.
6. FMFM 11-1
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 11-1 specifies organi-
zation and standards for individual team and unit NBC defense
matters within the Fleet Marine Force. It is the "working
manual" for all Fleet Marine Force NBC defense operations.
At the present time it is being reevaluated by the FMF NBC
Defense Schools at the request of the Marine Corps Development




FMF NBC Defense Orders and Directives
FMFLANT and FMFPAC publish separate NBC defense
directives, which closely parallel MCO 3400.3 but with specific
instructions applicable to that command's unique considerations
This is repeated and duplicated throughout the Division/Wing,
Regiment/Group, and Battalion/Squadron command structure SOP's
with additional requirements incorporated at each level
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of command. The final order provides the "working" SOP at
each respective organizational level. Due to the wide vari-
ation of emphasis placed on NBC defense matters by the different
commands, it is not unusual that dissimilar requirements and
guidance exist. Annual gas chamber exercises (GCX) are
required in certain commands but not in others; quarterly-
NBC defense drills are conscientiously conducted in many com-
mands but not in adjacent organizations. The commander's
prerogative is nowhere more evident than when examining the
NBC defense status of Fleet Marine Force organizations and
units. It is the author's experience (two years as a FMF
major command NBC defense inspector) that even sharing iden-
tical items of NBC defense equipment and manned by similarly
trained Marines, there nonetheless is a wide variance in
organization NBC defense effectiveness and readiness.
D. NBC DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
Fleet Marine Forces are equipped with the most modern
individual and organization NBC defensive equipment available
to ensure mission accomplishment within an NBC environment.
Each organization's T/E lists those items of NBC defense
equipment and the quantities authorized. These items are
either issued to the individual Marine or physically stored
in the organization's NBC defense ready locker, shelter, or
supply warehouse, ready for immediate issue, use or embarkation.
Appendix F provides information on NBC defense equipment avail-
able to Fleet Marine Forces and also discusses standard and




Inspections which are conducted in all Marine Corps
organizations and units are similar in method and motive.
Written inspection reports are provided by the respective
inspection team to the inspected organization upon completion
of the inspection, following an inspection debrief to the
organization commander. Corrective action, when required,
is mandated in the organization's inspection order, which in
turn specifies limits for correction of each noted discrepancy
and the subsequent reporting of corrective action taken via
the appropriate chain of command. In order of decreasing
importance, the following echelons of formal inspections are
conducted within the Fleet Marine Force.
1. Inspector General of the Marine Corps
(IGMC) Inspections
SECNAVINST 5430.57 provides that the Commandant of
the Marine Corps will conduct, or cause to be conducted, such
inspections as are required for a continuing evaluation of
Marine Corps organizations and units. MCO 5040.6 establishes
the following inspection objectives which are subject to IGMC
evaluation.
a. The capability and readiness to accomplish assigned
mission, tasks, and functions.
b. Leadership and effective use of resources.
c. Welfare, morale, and discipline.




e. Work practices and conditions which might expose
personnel unnecessarily to injury and health hazards.
f. Local inspection procedures, to determine if they
are keeping the commander informed of the conditions of the
command.
Fleet Marine Force organizations are inspected bien-
nially by the IGMC. An inspection schedule and tentative
schedule for two successive fiscal years is provided in MCO
5040.5. No NBC defense inspectors are provided within any
IGMC Inspection Team; to amend this, an augmentee inspector
is assigned TAD to the Inspection Division from available
Marine Corps assets (usually from the organization adjacent
to the organization under inspection) . The only area of NBC
defense inspected by the IGMC is that of radiac instrument
maintenance
.
2 . FMF Atlantic/Pacific Inspections
Both FMFLANT and FMFPAC inspect their respective sub-
ordinate commands during the alternate year that their command
is not scheduled for inspection by the IGMC. Inspection teams
from each of the respective headquarters battalions are tasked
with inspection of all areas inspected by the IGMC. Once
again augmentee inspectors are used to supplement FMF Head-
quarters Inspection Teams. The NBC defense portion of the
inspection is normally conducted by a senior staff NCO from
either an adjacent Marine Corps base or Marine Corps air
station. This eliminates, to the maximum extent possible,
any "conflict of interest" or subconscious bias on the part
of the assigned inspector. .„

3. Marine Division/Marine Aircraft Wing
Administration and Material (A$M) Inspections
The Division/Wing A§M Inspection generally precedes
the IGMC/FMF Headquarters Inspection. A§M Inspections are
conducted with organic personnel, meeting a schedule tailored
to the deployments and exercises of the organization. In the
NBC defense area, the A§M Inspection is the most comprehensive
of the NBC defense inspections encountered. The respective
NBC defense school staff is normally assigned to conduct the
inspections, and being totally familiar with existing require-
ments, can readily assess unit effectiveness and readiness.
4
.
Marine Regiment/Marine Aircraft Group Inspections
Inspections of organic units are conducted at regiment/
group level, using headquarters personnel and personnel from
sister organizations. Such "in-house" inspections are normally
comprehensive and, due to their basic "helpful" nature, provide
for maximum presentability of the unit prior to higher-level
inspection. The self- inspection program permeates to platoon
and section levels, and is assisted by the ready availability
of local or higher headquarters inspection "checklists" which
specify the extent of each inspection. There are presently
no true operational inspections, per se, that would enable
evaluation of the overall capabilities and functioning of a
unit in NBC defense matters or contingencies within the Fleet
Marine Force.
Many of the NBC defense inspectors are obtained from NBC
defense school personnel. Chapter V will provide further in-




































Grade USMC FMF Grade USMC FMF
0-6 3 1 E-9 3 2
0-5 25 7 E-8 9 6
0-4 48 24 E-7 48 29
0-3 20 7 E-6 103 78
0-2 8 6 E-5 103 96
0-1 1 1 E-4 20 16
CWO-4 2 2 E-3 4 4
CWO-3 5 4 E-2 2 2
CWO- 2 2 1 E-l
WO-1
_0 Total 292 253
Total 114 53
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V. FMF NBC DEFENSE SCHOOLS
Marine Corps directives do not currently provide for a
formal Marine Corps NBC defense school. With the U.S. Army
Ordnance Center and School being the only school authorized
to grant secondary MOS 5702 to Marine officers and primary
MOS 5711 to enlisted Marines, the number of OF 57 personnel
within the Marine Corps is thus directly related to the number
of quotas available to the U.S. Army school. These quotas are
established during the annual OF 57 study conducted by Head-
quarters, Marine Corps (Code OTTB) , at which time a three-year
projection for future OF 57 personnel needs is made. There are
roughly 70 quotas available annually under the present study.
To fulfill the requirements for NBC defense personnel
generated by MCO 5400.3, the Marine Corps operates four semi-
formal NBC defense schools. These schools are located at 3d
MAW, MCAS, El Toro, and 1st MARDIV, MCB Camp Pendleton, Cali-
fornia, and 2d MAW, MCAS Cherry Point, and FMFLANT (Camp Geiger)
,
MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Each school provides instruc-
tion and training to unit NBC defense personnel and team
members. These schools are not authorized to grant any MOS.
Commanding officers may grant a secondary MOS 5711 to their
enlisted Marines who successfully complete a four-week NBC
defense school in accordance with procedures contained in
Marine Corps Order P107Q.12.
The following Marine Corps NBC defense schools are in
current operation within the Fleet Marine Force:
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A. 3d MAW NBC DEFENSE SCHOOL
The 3d MAW NBC Defense School provides NBC defense
instruction and training for the following Marine Corps
commands
:
3d Marine Aircraft Wing (El Toro, Santa Ana, and
Camp Pendleton, California and Yuma, Arizona)
Marine Corps Supply Center (MCSC) , Barstow, California
Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) , San Diego, California
MCAS, Yuma, Arizona
MCAS (Helicopter), Santa Ana, California
Force Troops Pacific, MCB, 29 Palms, California
First Force Services Support Group (1st PSSG)
,
Camp Pendleton, California
It additionally provides instruction, upon request, for
all Marine Corps Reserve organizations located west of the
Mississippi River. 3d MAW Order 3400.3 prescribes the command
relationship, mission, courses of instruction, and administrative
requirements of the school. Table V provides the T/0 that is
presently in effect at the 3d MAW NBC Defense School.
The Technical Assistance Team, commonly referred to as a
"Contact Team," provides NBC defense assistance on an informal
request basis to all 3d MAW and adjacent Marine Commands.
Technical Assistance Team visits normally encompass all unit
NBC defense aspects during a one-day (0800 to 1500) visit.
Technical Assistance Team members are rotated on a regular
basis within the 3d MAW NBC Defense School staff.
The 3d MAW NBC Defense Inspector is assigned from the
school staff and assists in the conduct of 3d MAW A§M inspec-
tions and Commander, Air Bases West (COMCABWEST) inspections





The school additionally provides gas chamber facilities
for unit training exercises. A total of 3,195 personnel
participated in 3d MAW gas chamber exercises conducted from
1 January 1976 through 15 August 1977.
Mandatory quotas to the 3d MAW NBC Defense School courses
are assigned via 3d MAW training directives; quotas may be
augmented via letter or by telephone in coordination with the
Off icer-in-Charge, 3d MAW NBC Defense School. At the present
time the school is staffed with one officer and 15 enlisted
Marines
.
The school presents two courses of instruction:
1
.
NBC Defense Officer Course
This course is 20 instructional days in length and
provides a working knowledge of all aspects of NBC defense.
The course syllabus includes agents and effects, self- and
first-aid measures, care and surveillance of NBC defense
equipment, radiological plotting, decontamination, and Control
Center operations. This course is normally scheduled twice a
year. Course prerequisites are:
a. One year obligated service remaining upon assign-
ment.
b. Nominees should be available for assignment to an
NBC defense billet within their unit.
c. Nominees must possess a Secret security clearance.
2 NBC Defense Basic Enlisted Course
This course is 15 instructional days in length and
qualifies enlisted personnel to perform duties within the unit
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NBC defense organization. The course syllabus includes
effects, protective measures, techniques of monitoring and
surveying, detection, identification, decontamination, and
Control Center operations. Staff non-commissioned officers
may be assigned to this class on request. This course is
normally scheduled ten times per year. Course prerequisites
are
:
a. Minimum GCT or Area Aptitude score of 100.
b. High School graduate or have passed the GED test.
c. Six months obligated service remaining upon
assignment
.
d. Satisfactory motivation for assignment to a key
position within the organization's NBC defense structure.
e. Nominees must not be participating in any extra
education programs that may affect their performance at NBC
defense school.
f. Nominees must not be awaiting punitive action.
g. Nominees must be interviewed by their unit NBC
Defense Officer to determine if any problem, personal or
otherwise, exists that would inhibit the satisfactory com-
pletion of the course.
h. Nominees must not be assigned on any current unit
duty rosters.
B. FMFLANT NBC DEFENSE SCHOOL
The FMFLANT NBC Defense School provides NBC defense instruc'
tion and training for the following Marine Corps commands:
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Second Force Service Support Group (2d FSSG) , MCB
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
Force Troops, Atlantic, MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
2d Marine Division, MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, MCAS Cherry Point, North
Carolina.
It additionally provides instruction, upon request, for
all Marine Corps Reserve ground organizations of the 4th
MARDIV located east of the Mississippi River. Force Troops
Atlantic Order 5320.2 specifies school functions and require-
ments. Table VI presents the current T/O in effect which is
staffed by both Force Troops, Atlantic, and 2d MARDIV personnel.
The FMFLANT NBC Defense School does not provide a Technical
Assistance Team to Force Troops or the 2d MARDIV, but is study-
ing the concept at the present time. NBC defense inspectors
for Force Troops, Atlantic units are conducted using the school
staff, but 2d MARDIV NBC defense inspections are conducted by
2d MARDIV G-3 NBC defense personnel.
The school presents two courses of instruction:
1. NBC Defense Officer/SNCO Course
This course is 19 instructional days in length and is
designed to qualify FMFLANT personnel from any MOS for assign-
ment to unit NBC defense billets and train and provide
instructional material so that graduates may be utilized by
units in performing instructional duties. This course is
divided into six subcourses: Nuclear Defense, Biological
Defense, Chemical Defense, Radiac Instruments, NBC Protection,
and NBC Operations. The only course prerequisite is that
assignees have a minimum of six months obligated service
remaining upon assignment. This course is normally scheduled
four times a year.
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2. NBC Defense Monitor/Survey and Decontamination
Team Course
This course is 13 instructional days in length and is
designed to train FMFLANT personnel for unit Monitor/Survey
and Decontamination Team assignments. It is divided into
five subcourses: Nuclear Defense, Biological Defense, Chem-
ical Defense, Radiac Instruments, and NBC Protection. This
curriculum is oriented to practical application, and in addi-
tion to the basic instruction, four quizzes, two comprehensive
exams, and eight practical exams are administered. Course
prerequisites are:
a. High school graduate or have passed the GED test.
b. Minimum GCT or Area Aptitude score of 100.
c. Six months obligated service remaining upon
assignment.
The School Director is authorized to waive the first
two prerequisites for basic 5700 personnel (assigned directly
from Infantry Training School for on-the-job training) and
assignees from FMFLANT units. This course is normally scheduled
11 times a year. Upon successful course completion, a list of
all graduates is forwarded to Headquarters, Marine Corps (Code
MMEA and MMDA)
.
The FMFLANT NBC Defense School provides a post-
graduation evaluation questionnaire to the Commanding Officers
of all school graduates; this form is designed to evaluate the
performance of graduates within their unit in their NBC defense
capacity. Feedback from this questionnaire enables the school
to correct or modify course content in subsequent courses, if
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applicable, and implement any positive critique regarding
the curriculum.
A M12A1 Skid Mounted Decontamination Apparatus (SMDA)
Operator's Course is provided to graduates of any NBC defense
school for a two-day period. This course is provided to
assist unit commanders in maintaining unit NBC defense capa-
bilities and provides the instruction necessary to maintain
and operate the M12A1.
The FMFLANT NBC Defense School is presently the only
Marine Corps NBC Defense School which possesses adequate
facilities for the purpose of granting a primary MOS 5711.
The school is currently staffed with two officers and 13
enlisted Marines.
C. 1st MARDIV NBC DEFENSE SCHOOL
The 1st MARDIV NBC Defense School provides NBC defense
instruction and training for all 1st MARDIV units as part of
the 1st MARDIV School Complex (NBC Defense School, 81MM Mortar
School, and two NCO Leadership School courses. 1st MARDIV
Order 1510.1 establishes the school complex and specifies
administrative requirements . There is no formal T/O for the
NBC Defense School staff, and only two instructors are pres-
ently assigned from the Division G-3, the NCOIC (Master
Sergeant) and his assistant (Gunnery Sergeant) . A third
instructor has been requested to assist with future classes.
There is no Technical Assistance Team organization within
the school, nor does the 1st MARDIV NBC Defense School staff
become involved in assisting in Division inspections.
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Gas chamber facilities are available at the school for
unit use, but due to the wide geographical separation of
Division units, each organization maintains their own gas
chamber facilities.
The school presents two courses of instruction:
1. Staff NCO and Officer NBC Defense Course
This course is ten instructional days in length and
provides a basic course for staff non-commissioned officers
and officers, with particular emphasis on maintenance of T/E
items, chemical and nuclear defense, and individual and unit
protective measures. There are no course prerequisites and
two classes are normally scheduled each year.
2
.
Enlisted NBC Defense Course
This course is 15 instructional days in length, and
provides a basic course in all areas of unit and individual
NBC defense to qualify graduates as unit NBC Defense team
members. Course prerequisites are:
a. GCT or Area Aptitude score of 90.
b. Six months' obligated service remaining upon
assignment
.
The School Director is authorized to waive the GCT/Area
Aptitude prerequisite for those Marines whom he determines
possess the aptitude and motivation necessary for successful
course completion. Six classes are normally scheduled each
year; commencing in September 1977, a four-week course will
be presented, but the exact course mix for future scheduling
has not yet been determined.
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Officers and staff non-commissioned officers may be
assigned to the enlisted course and vice versa. During the
Division G-3 Quarterly Training Conferences, classes which
are to be presented and respective quota assignments are
determined.
D. 2d MAW NBC DEFENSE SCHOOL
The 2d MAW NBC Defense School is in the process of re-
building and revising after its closure during 1976 and sub-
sequent revival this year. At the present time there is no
order directing its establishment or purpose although such
an order is currently being written. This school serves all
2d MAW units and units of the 4th MAW (Reserve) located east
of the Mississippi River. The current school staff is comprised
of:
Billet Rank MOS Total
OIC Lt Unrestricted 1
NCOIC MSgt 5711 1
Instructor SSgt 5711 2
Instructor Sgt 5711 2
6
The school offers one course, the 2d MAW Monitor and
Decontamination Course, which is ten instructional days in
length. The course is scheduled 20 times per year. Instruc-
tion is limited to basic NBC defense team matters. Course
prerequisites are:
a. Minimum GCT score of 100.





There is no officer/staff non-commissioned officer course
offered; 2d MAW NBC Defense Officers attend the FMFLANT NBC
Defense Officer/SNCO Course, as do certain selected enlisted
Marines
.
The school provides gas chamber facilities for all MCAS
Cherry Point, North Carolina, Marines. The school does not
provide a Technical Assistance Team.
E. NBC DEFENSE SCHOOLS WITHIN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA
NBC defense training for Marines assigned to the Western
Pacific area is conducted within each organization due to the
lack of formal or semi-formal schooling facilities.
The 3d MARDIV has established a Technical Assistance Team
for their units; this team provides a three-day block of
instruction to the unit's NBC defense team members, followed
by a one-day assistance program designed to aid the unit NBC
Officer and NBC Defense Specialis t/NCO in their unit NBC
defense matters. Present plans call for the presentation of
a three-week NBC defense course to be offered once a quarter.
The 1st MAW, upon the closure of the 3d MARDIV NBC Defense
School, began a Monitor/Survey and Decontamination Course at
the MCAS Iwakuni, Japan. This school was terminated in July
1977.
The 1st Marine Brigade, Camp Smith, Hawaii, is conducting
a monitor/ survey and decontamination course for 1st Marine
Brigade Marines. This school is not considered comparable to
the four semi- formal NBC Defense Schools and is concerned with
the training of 1st Marine Brigade NBC defense team personnel.
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F. A COMPARISON OF FMF NBC DEFENSE SCHOOLS
The major characteristics of each of the four semi-formal
NBC Defense Schools currently in existence are provided in





NBC Defense School Staff
Billet Rank MOS Total
OIC Capt/Lt/WO 5702 1
NCOIC MGSgt/MSgt 5711 1
Chief Instructor GySgt/SSgt 5711 1
Instructor GySgt/SSgt 5711 3
Instructor Sgt/Cpl 5711 3
Clerk/Typist/ Driver Cpl/LCpl 0141/3531 1
Corp sman/ Ins true tor HM- 1,2,3 8403 1
11
Technical Assistance Team









Table V - 3d MAW NBC Defense School T/O
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Billet Rank MOS Source/Total
Director Maj or/Capt 5702 FORTRPS 1
Assistant Director Capt/Lt Unrestricted 2dMAWDIV 1
Operations Chief MSgt/GySgt 5711 FORTRPS 1
Instructor/ Supervisor GySgt 5711 2dMAWDIV 1
Senior Instructor SSgt 5711 2dMAWDIV 3
Instructor Sgt 5711 FORTRPS 2
Instructor Sgt 5711 2dMAWDIV 2
Corpsman/ Ins true tor HM-1 8403 FORTRPS 1
Engineer -Maintenance
Man
Cpl 1341 FORTRPS 1
Training Support NCX Cpl 5711 2dMAWDIV 1
Admin Man Cpl 0151 FORTRPS 1
Supply Clerk Sgt 3043 2dMAWDIV 1
Driver/Assistant
Supply Clerk
Cpl 3531 FORTRPS 1
17
Table VI - FMFLANT NBC Defense School T/0
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2d MAW 3d MAW 1st MARDIV FMFLANT
Formal School Order No Yes Yes Yes
School Staff (Off/enl) 1/5 1/15 0/2 2/15
M/S $ Decon Cse (days) Yes (10) No No Yes (13)
Yes (20) Yes (15) No


















Yes Yes No Yes
No Yes No No
Yes Yes Yes
Table VII - Comparison of FMF NBC Defense Schools
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VI. NBC DEFENSE TRAINING AND OPERATIONS IN THE FMF
A. NBC DEFENSE TRAINING IN THE FMF
NBC defense training has been incorporated into practically
every facet of Marine Corps individual training. The major
training vehicles used within the Marine Corps are examined
in the following chapter and correspond to respective officer
and enlisted career patterns.
1. Officer Candidate School (PCS) and The Basic School (TBS)
OCS and TBS, both located at MCDEC, Quantico, Virginia,
are the initial formal training mechanisms used to process and
evaluate Marine Officer Candidates prior to commissioning and
to provide basic officer training to the newly commissioned
officer, respectively. OCS provides a broad overview of the
Marine Corps during an intensive ten-week session of indoc-
trination and training. There is, however, no NBC defense
instruction presented during OCS. Upon successful completion
of OCS, the new Second Lieutenant enters TBS, currently 22 weeks
in length. TBS prepares the Lieutenant for his apprenticeship
in the FMF; courses cover all major topics and practical field
applications are associated with most classroom instruction.
A total of five hours is devoted to NBC defense during TBS;
this is separated into three hours of NBC lectures and a two
hour gas chamber exercise. Riot control agent CS is employed
during two field exercises. By the time an officer is assigned
to his first command, his knowledge of NBC defense is limited
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to this short indoctrination. The current NBC defense
instructor at TBS does not hold MOS 5702.
2. CBR Officer Course
A selected few Marine Officers (six during FY 1978)
will attend this course which is presented at the U.S. Army
Ordnance Center and School, U.S. Army Proving Ground, Aberdeen,
Maryland. This is a four-week course and is offered ten times
per year. Its purpose is to train officers of all arms and
services in chemical, biological and radiological operations
and applicable training techniques. The scope of the course
includes operations, training and intelligence, logistics,
technical aspects of biological and chemical operations,
nuclear operations and radiological defense, protection and
material, and medical training and support. Course prerequi-
sites are an interim Secret security clearance and be in the
rank of First Lieutenant through Major. Graduates of this
school are assigned MOS 5702 by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. Headquarters, Marine Corps controls quotas to the
school, and normally assigns all quotas to FMF commands.
3. Communication Officers Advanced Course (ACOC)
,
Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School (MCAWS)
,
and Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCC$SC)
ACOC and MCAWS are the two Marine Corps intermediate
level schools for Captains and Majors. Located at MCDEC,
Quantico, Virginia, both curricula are nine months in length
and are entirely classroom/lecture oriented. Each course
presents the identical three hour block of instruction on
foreign NBC offensive and defensive capabilities.
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MCC§SC, the only Marine Corps high level school, which is
also located at Quantico, Virginia, presents only two hours
of instruction on foreign nuclear and chemical capabilities;
the biological brief is omitted due to a time constraint.
The program of instruction (POI) in each of the three school
presentations is. identical and is presented by instructors
from the Supporting Arms Instruction Division, Education Center,
MCDEC. At the present time, none of the instructors possess
MOS 5702. During calendar year 1978 classes, each school is
tentatively scheduled to receive instruction from the Depart-
ment of Defense Interservice Nuclear Weapon School (INWS)
,
Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. ACOC and
MCAWS will receive a 14-hour block of instruction and MCC^SC
will receive a six-hour block of instruction. This instruction
will fill the void in the current curricula and provide a
deeper appreciation and knowledge of NBC defense matters to
future Marine Corps commanders and policy makers.
4 . Marine Corps Recruit Training and Infantry
Training School (ITS)
The two Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRD) , located
at San Diego, California and Parris Island, South Carolina,
provide entry-level training for new Marine recruits. Their
respective Recruit Training Regiments provide 11 weeks of
training, all of which is presented at an extremely basic
level. Such is the case with NBC defense; the recruit receives
four hours of NBC defense instruction in conjunction with
essential subjects training (discussed in Chapter IV). This
instruction includes the proper fitting and care of the FPM,
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participation in a gas chamber exercise, and live-fire of
the service rifle while wearing the FPM. Lesson POIs are
oriented toward the practical application of individual pro-
tective techniques and procedures while operating within an
NBC environment. Specialized weapons training at ITS, located
at MCB Camp Pendleton, California, and MCB Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, follows MCRD training and covers a 20-day course.
No NBC defense material or procedures are instructed during
ITS.
5. CBR Enlisted Course
This course is the enlisted counterpart of the CBR
Officer Course and is also located at Aberdeen, Maryland.
Material presented during this four-week course is nearly
identical to the CBR Officer Course with the exclusion of
classified lectures. Graduates are assigned MOS 5711. No
security clearance is required and the course is available
to all enlisted personnel with a GCT of 100 or a standard
score of 100 in aptitude area GT. Twenty CBR Enlisted Courses
are scheduled each year. Quotas are controlled by Headquarters,
Marine Corps. Assignees to this school are predominantly
Corporals and above who have reenlisted under a school option.
During FY 1978, 68 enlisted Marines will attend this course.
6. FMF NBC Defense Schools
FMF NBC defense schools were discussed in detail in
Chapter V. Training offered by these schools is oriented
toward unit NBC defense team personnel training and NBC Offi-
cer /NCO training. Table VIII provides the total number of
83

graduates during the period from 1 January 1977 through 15
August 1977. The majority of the graduates were Monitor/
Survey and Decontamination Course trainees, accounting for
59.31 of the total; 12.11 of all graduates were officers.
Tables IX and X provide a comparison of the curricula of the
FMF NBC Defense Schools by subcourse and content.
7. Marine Corps Extension School Correspondence Courses
Marines unable to attend the Staff Non-commissioned
Officer Academy (SNCOA) , TBS, MCAWS , or MCC§SC are provided
the opportunity to participate in their respective level
course through correspondence courses offered by The Exten-
sion School, Education Center, MCDEC
,
Quantico, Virginia.
The completion of the correspondence extension course (EC)
is considered the equivalent to the resident course for all
appropriate purposes, including assignment, promotion, and
satisfying professional level schooling requirements.
The times allocated (in estimated hours of student
effort) in each respective course for NBC defense are:
SNCOAEC: none; TBSEC: nine hours; MCAWSEC: 12 hours, and
MCCSSCEC: four hours. It must be noted that it is difficult
to compare or equate the effectiveness of a home study program




The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) , located in Washington,
D.C., provides all Marines the opportunity to expand their
professional skills within or outside of their MOS . Courses
are offered in practically every MOS, and three such courses
are offered in NBC defense:
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a. MCI Course 03.25: NBC Defense for the Marine
This course is designed for all MOS ' s encompassing
the grades of Private through Master Gunnery Sergeant. Six
(6) lessons, which cover a total instructional time (estimated)
of 14 hours, instruct Marines how to prepare themselves to
carry out their mission under the threat of, or under condi-
tions resulting from a NBC attack. Emphasis is placed on NBC
defense for the individual Marine with specific guidance on
what to do before, during, and after NBC attacks.
b. MCI Course 57.6: Chemical Warfare Defense
This course is designed for MOS 5711 and those
Marines in the rank of Private through Gunnery Sergeant. It
is comprised of four lessons with a total instructional time
of 12 hours. It instructs detection and identification equip-
ment, decontamination and related equipment, the NBC defense
unit, self- and first-aid, preventive maintenance, and storage
of selected chemical equipment.
c. MCI Course 57.7: Nuclear Warfare Defense
This course is designed for MOS 5711 and encom-
passes grades of Corporal through Master Gunnery Sergeant.
Four lessons provide a total instructional time of 19 hours.
This course provides a source of references and study material
which, when combined with on-the-job training, will enable the
NBC Defense Specialist to determine the effects of nuclear
explosions and determine entry and stay time in a contaminated
area.

MCI courses are excellent training devices with one
exception: MCI participation is strictly voluntary. The vast
majority of commands "strongly encourage" MCI participation,
but this is with near disregard for the subject matter studied.
The authors' experience has shown that Marines thusly "encour-
aged" will either enroll in a course in which they are totally
familiar with the course material or a course that requires
the shortest period of time for completion. This personal
effort ensures recognition by the command but only a minimal
effort on the Marine's part. As long as these attitudes pre-
vail, the MCI NBC defense courses will remain a valuable but
relatively undiscovered source of information for all but a
few conscientious Marines.
9. NBC Defense Related Courses
There are three formal courses of instruction available
to selected Marines which are closely related to NBC defense
and require prior NBC defense knowledge and training.
a. Technical Escort Course
This is a four-week course conducted at the U.S.
Army Missile and Munitions Center and School, Redstone Arsenal,
Huntsville, Alabama. The course provides technical instruction
in the safe handling of toxic materials and is open to Captains
and below in the officer ranks and Staff Sergeants through
Privates First Class in the enlisted ranks. Quotas are con-




b. Marine Nuclear Ordnance Platoon (NOP) Course
This is a six-week school conducted by the Naval
Weapons Training Group Pacific, NAS North Island, San Diego,
California. This course trains selected officers and non-
commissioned officers for duty with Marine Nuclear Ordnance
Platoons. Two classes are presented annually, and Warrant
Officers through Captain and enlisted Marines in the grade
of Staff Sergeant are eligible for attendance. Officers
receive MOS 5720 and enlisted personnel MOS 8062, upon course
completion.
c. Marine Nuclear Weapons Assembly Team
This is an eight-week school also conducted by the
Naval Weapons Training Group Pacific. The course trains selected
officers and non-commissioned officers for duty with the Marine
Wing Weapons Unit (MWWU) and covers the mission and technical
training required to maintain and handle nuclear weapons
assigned. This course is presented once a year; upon course
completion officers are assigned MOS 5710 and enlisted personnel
MOS 8061.
B. NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN THE FMF
NBC operations in the FMF during the past decade have been
restricted to the use of riot control agents and chemical defol-
iants. Both of these chemical agents saw only limited usage
during FMF involvement in Southeast Asia.
RCA CS, in its different weapons systems (grenades, dis-
pensers, shells, projectiles, launchers, and cartridges) was
used as an effective means of clearing out enemy bunkers.
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A combination of CS and smoke was used in the streets of Hue,
Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) during the Tet offensive of
1968, providing excellent cover for Marine forces. CS was
primarily used in hand grenade form (M7A2 and M25A2 grenades)
,
but reliance for tactical delivery was placed on the E8 Tacti-
cal CS Launcher. This 34-pound launcher contains 64 35-milli-
meter cartridges, each of which has an individual propellent
charge. When fired, either manually or electrically, all
cartridges are discharged at once and fall in an elliptical
pattern; the range to the center of the pattern can be adjusted
from to 150 meters. CS 40-millimeter cartridges for the M79
grenade launcher were used to supplement coverage provided by
the E8's. CS was used extensively in an operation conducted
by the 3d Battalion, 7th iMarine Regiment, 1st Marine Division
during the 1969 post-Tet offensive to dislodge North Vietnam
Army (NVA) forces of the 141st NVA Regiment. The E8 launcher
was later adapted for installation on M35 trucks to afford an
incapacitating and screening shield for convoys which were
continuously subjected to ambush. The use of selected herb-
icides (2-4D, 2-4-5T) was effective in reducing the heavy
vegetation surrounding Marine fire support bases in Northern
I Corps during 1969 and 1970. Fortunately, enemy employment
of chemical weapons was virtually nonexistent; a few reported
attacks were not substantiated and although Marines did have
opportunities to use their FPM, it was normally with the





Much has been written up to this point concerning the
threat, organization, schools, and training related to NBC
defense. It has been objective in nature and has presented
a detailed examination of the structure of the Marine Corps
NBC defense field. The "bottom line" must soon be reached
and the question asked "Is the Marine Corps ready to operate
effectively in an NBC environment?" The subjective opinion
of the authors, based on over 21 years of Marine Corps exper-
ience, is that the Fleet Marine Forces are not presently ready
for NBC combat operations.
Readiness, like effectiveness, is not easy to define. In
a general sense it can be described as the potential of combat
organizations to achieve their mission. An example, which is
an indication of the level of NBC defense readiness, is the
length of time it would take to deploy combat forces and en-
gage an enemy, and how long combat could be sustained under
NBC conditions. Thus defined, readiness will depend on the
quantity and quality of resources available in peacetime, as
well as the capability to meet the expected surge in demand
that would result from sustained combat. All those activities
(training, personal assignment, logistic support, base/station
operations, and Headquarters) which are vitally important to
readiness must reach an agreement on how much of each is
required to ensure the level of readiness necessary for
organic support and survivability,
Within the FMF , one of the major problems lies in the
lack of both physical training facilities and personnel
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required to effectively train Marines in NBC defense. The
training facilities at the four FMF NBC defense schools are
inadequately funded and poorly maintained, not due to a lack
of attention of the respective school staffs, but because of
the low priority placed on the entire NBC defense program.
This lack of emphasis permeates most units and organizations
and has the long-run effect of degrading the training offered
at the NBC defense schools and disillusioning OF 57 personnel.
The latter is reflected in the low esteem held of the NBC
defense field by most officers today; this partially created
by the assignment of mandatory NBC defense requirements and,
in a lesser manner, due to unpleasant individual experiences
in previous NBC defense training (i.e., the mandatory removal
of the FPM during gas chamber exercises in order to receive
the effects of RCA CS and appreciate the protection the FPM
affords its wearer, and the blister agent (HD) indoctrination
exercise using a live HD solution conducted in pre-1970 NBC
defense schools)
.
The use of live chemical agents in training is severely
restricted in most areas and prohibited in many locations.
Restrictions placed on FMF organizations overseas, particularly
in Japan, force the majority of operations to simulate enemy
chemical agent employment through the use of smoke grenades,
and actual riot control agents are used only under controlled
conditions (gas chamber exercises). The infantry battalions
issue the FPM to all personnel as part of their individual gear
issue; the majority of Marine Aircraft Wing personnel, however,
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rarely see a FPM outside of their annual service rifle firing
requirement while wearing a FPM. On a recent major operation,
a FMF squadron deployed without taking any item of NBC defense
equipment, all of which remained in the squadron warehouse
awaiting the forthcoming FMF PAC Inspection Team.
Because of the lack of realism associated with simulating
an NBC condition during operations, in most cases NBC defense
is either excluded from operation or exercise play or is
ignored in toto. Exclusion of NBC defense from operational
play is effectively employed by writing a NBC defense annex
which acknowledges the enemy capability in NBC warfare but
which discounts any potential use during the operational
scenario.
A senior Marine, who has been involved in the Marine Corps
NBC defense field since its inception in 1953, had this comment
on NBC defense readiness: "At this point in time, it would be
inappropriate (if not obscene) to comment on our ability to
meet a Russian NBC threat. We have to be honest enough to
admit to ourselves that we are sorely lacking in proper train-





OFFICERS SNCOs ENLISTED TOTAL
1st MARDIV 17 6 154 177
2d MAW 6 184 190
3d MAW 50 209* 259
FMFLANT 81 424* 505
Total 154 6 971 1,131
1st MARDIV 20 12 111 143
2d MAW 7 6 274 287
3d MAW 17 115* 132
FMFLANT 68 354* 422
Total 112 18 854 984
* SNCOs included with enlisted graduates; percentage
estimated less than 10 percent.
Table VIII - FMF NBC Defense School Graduates
(1 January 1976 to 15 August 1977)
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School FMFLANT 1st MARDIV* 2d MAW 3d MAW*
Length (days) 13 15 10 15
ENTRY/ADMIN PROCEDURES (Hours) (Hours) (Hours) (Hours)
Check- In/Introduction 5.5 7.0 3. 5 4.0
FPM/GCX 5.0 5.0 3.0 3.0
PT 5.0 5.0 - -
Admin Time/Field Day 4.0 2.0 2.5 6.5
NUCLEAR
Nuclear Defense Instruction 24.5 45.0 21.0 36.0
Quizzes § Critiques (No.) (2) 1.0 (3) 1.5 (1) 0.5 (3) 1.5





Quizzes § Critiques (No.) (1) 0.5 - (1) 0.5 -
Exam § Critique (No.) (1) 1.0 (2) 2.0 (1) 1.5
CHEMICAL
Chemical Defense Instruction 29.0 35.0 19.0 29.0
Quizzes $ Critiques (No.) (2) 1.0 (3) 1.5 (1) 0.5 (3) 1.5
Exam $ Critique (No.) (2) 5.0 (1) 1.5 (1) 0.5 (1) 1.5
EXIT PROCEDURES
Final Exam § Critique 8.0 - 2.5
Summary 1 . - - 4.0
Graduation § Checkout 5.5 1.0 2. 5 3.0
Total Hours 96.0 126.0 64.0 103.0
* These courses provide the same function as Monitor/Survey
and Decontamination courses for unit training purposes.
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VII. FMF NBC DEFENSE STANDARDIZATION: A PROPOSAL
This final chapter will attempt to analyze the problems
that exist within the Marine Corps' NBC defense field and
offer recommendations and proposals to implement controls
into the current structure. Basically, the present system
is weak and lacks the direction, command attention and aware-
ness necessary to make it an effective mechanism within the
FMF. The recommendations offered will be of a general nature
in order to establish the proper framework from which opera-
tions can begin. Once this major obstacle is overcome, spe-
cifics may be addressed at the unit level. This establishes
some autonomy and direction for field commanders yet will
avoid the wide apathy, disparity, and non-compliance that
exists today.
A. FMF NBC DEFENSE SCHOOL STANDARDIZATION
The first areas of standardization to be explored are the
monitor/survey and decontamination course and the NBC Defense
Officer/SNCO Course. Chapter V delineated the purpose, loca-
tion, and general characteristics of each type of school. No
attempt was made, however, to draw any inference or correlation
among the schools in question. The main reasons for this
omission were the incongruities existing within the four
schools which purport to accomplish the same objective.
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1. Monitor/Survey and Decontamination Course
Upon receipt of the respective curricula from the
four FMF NBC defense schools, a comparison was attempted.
It was immediately noted that there were few common character-
istics but the differences were quite pronounced. The actual
matrix which was formulated (Table IX) had to be expressed in
the most general of terms to cover every aspect in each of
the four schools. The course lengths varied from 10 to 15
instructional days, and the course titles were as varied as
the number of schools presenting them. While the basic refer-
ence texts were the same for each school, the actual material
being taught could not be fully determined. Subcourse material
varied greatly within each respective school's lesson plans
which supposedly covered identical subject matter. It was
impossible to discern the actual emphasis placed within each
area of instruction, although it was readily apparent that
more time was devoted to nuclear than chemical defense in
three of the four schools.
The monitor/survey and decontamination courses are not
designed to make an NBC Defense Specialist out of its graduate,
but rather to train him to function effectively as an organi-
zation or unit NBC defense team member. As a result, the
instructional technique in a school of this type should be
directed towards a "hands on" learning process. The present
trend within existing monitor/survey and decontamination
courses is to offer as much material as possible, often for-
getting the goal of the course is to train the Marine in
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monitor/ survey and decontamination procedures only, and not
to function as an NBC Defense Specialist. This is evidenced
in the "school creep" wherein the original courses were
planned to be only ten days in length; today only one of the
four schools has not extended past this course length. Per-
formance oriented training (such as that offered at the MCRD
wherein the trainee performs the desired function under
supervision) has proven an effective vehicle for disseminating
basic skills in new subject matter. The student performance
objective (SPO) tells the learner exactly what he must be able
to do to demonstrate that he has absorbed what was intended.
It also tells him how well he has to perform and under what
conditions. The ability or inability to perform can be easily
verified; here the quality of feedback, not the quality of
instruction, is the issue. Concurrently, the quality of in-
struction will improve with the quality of the feedback. It
is recommended that all monitor/survey and decontamination
courses implement performance oriented training in their
immediate curricula, as well as within the new proposed
curricula.
The course of instruction should not be designed in
a high pressure, turnstile atmosphere where the only criteria
for performance is to maximize the number of graduates in the
shortest period of time. It should be a true learning device
whereby Marines are taught the mechanics of team and individual
NBC defense. In light of this belief, it is also recommended
that a course length of ten instructional days would provide
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adequate time to cover the required material. This contrasts
with the U.S. Army's school proposal of seven days (Chapter
III) of a more intensified training program. The recommended
course of instruction for all monitor/survey and decontamin-
ation courses is provided in Table XI. It is presented in
general terms to conform with and offer comparison with the
existing school curricula (Table IX) .
The proposed school curricula would commence formal
classes on 1300 Friday and terminate two weeks following at
1130. This would allow adequate time in the respective morn-
ings and afternoons for travel to and from the school and for
check- in and check-out procedures. The actual instructional
time would be approximately 70 hours. Formal instruction
would be from 0800 until 1130 and from 1300 to 1630 daily.
There would be an 0745 formation and muster and a lunch period
from 1130 to 1300, allowing adequate time for travel to and
from messing facilities.
2. NBC Defense Of f icer/SNCO/Enlis ted Course
The two NBC Defense Officer/SNCO courses presently
offered at the FMFLANT and 3d MAW NBC Defense Schools are
fairly uniform in length and overall structure but differ in
their internal organization (Table X) . Course titles for the
same material are once again dissimilar, and the method of
presentation and allocation of time also varies. The need





Whenever this course is discussed, the question of
a secondary MOS 5702 or MOS 5711 arises. Both schools pro-
vide instruction that is Marine-oriented and, in most respects,
better preparation for Marine Corps NBC defense assignments
than the U.S. Army school. This is attributable to the
elimination of non-applicable classes presented in the U.S.
Army school which cover subjects not required by the Marine
Corps (flamethrowers, U.S. Army-peculiar equipment, techniques,
and supply procedures) and conversely by the fact the U.S.
Army school does not cover equipment and techniques the Marine
Corps has adopted. In their present form, it is believed that
a secondary MOS 5702 or MOS 5711 should be granted to all
of f icers/SNCO/enlisted graduates from either Marine Corps
school. There are obviously some very definite advantages
to this proposal, the most prevalent being the provision of
recognized (i.e., via a secondary MOS designation) schooling
while eliminating the costs involved in sending Marines TAD
to the U.S. Army school to receive the MOS designation. The
granting of a primary MOS 5702 or MOS 5711, however, is not
recommended at this particular time because of the inconsis-
tencies in training facilities, overall instructional expertise,
and lack of standardized POIs within both schools. Until the
Marine Corps is willing and able to make a commitment in the
field of NBC defense schooling, it is in the best interest
of the Marine Corps to continue to train its NBC Defense
Officers, who must fill a primary MOS 5702 billet, and NBC
Defense Specialists at the U.S. Army school. To do otherwise
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would degrade even further our already questionable NBC
defense capabilities.
It is recommended that each school's emphasis be
shifted from that of providing continuous four-week courses
on a month-to-month basis to analyzing instead their own
command requirements. Within the largest commands, proper
utilization of two officer courses and two combined SNCO/
enlisted courses would fulfill all command needs for NBC
Defense Officer billets and NBC Defense Specialist billets,
even if U.S. Army school graduates are not available. It
has also been found that the educational variance is generally
too wide to allow combined officer/SNCO courses without seri-
ously limiting the progression of course material at an overall
even flow. Unless an organization specifically so desires,
SNCO training is not required for the existing billets within
unit NBC defense teams. The low number of SNCOs actually
attending either school (provided in Section B of this chapter)
reinforces this recommendation.
Reallocation of the time presently devoted to the
three and four-week courses to two-week monitor/ survey and
decontamination courses would greatly contribute to the goal
of training adequate numbers of unit NBC defense team members;
two monitor/survey and decontamination courses can be substi-
tuted for each four-week course which is eliminated. Only in
this way will our existing schools be capable of providing an
adequate number of school- trained personnel as required by
both MCO 5400.3 and of necessity, if a viable unit NBC defense
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capability is to be a factual goal within the FMF. Our
existing approach, using the 3d MAW NBC Defense School as an
example, provides an inadequate number of overtrained unit
NBC defense team members. Presently offering two 20-day and
ten 15-day courses each year, and assuming a consistent class
population of 20 students per class, a maximum of 240 gradu-
ates can be realized in one year. Under our proposed approach,
80 officers and enlisted Marines still complete the 20-day
course, but 320 Marines would graduate from the monitor/survey
and decontamination course. This provides the 3d MAW with a
total of 160 additionally trained NBC defense team members
each year.
A generalized school curricula (Table XII) proposes
a school length of 20 instructional days with a total instruc-
tional time of 140 hours. The proposed time frame for daily
instruction is identical to that of the proposed monitor/survey
and decontamination course.
3 . NBC Defense Refresher Course
The U.S. Army Training Effectiveness Analysis (Chapter
III) demonstrated the loss of proficiency and knov/ledge degrada-
tion over time within the U.S. Army NBC field. As the majority
of primary MOS 5711 Marines are not fully utilized in their
specialty except for required training and immediately prior
to NBC defense inspections, their MOS proficiency is also
suspect. It is strange that no formal NBC defense refresher
course has ever been provided for OF 57 Marines. Such a course
is necessary to provide an updating within the field and
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reinforce basic knowledge acquired in initial NBC schooling.
It is. recommended that such a course be presented twice a
year, and that the course length be between three and five
instructional days. Course attendance would be mandatory
for all primary MOS 5711 Marines at one session per year.
This training would cover new equipment, lessons learned,
policy implemented or introduced during the previous twelve
months, new training approaches or devices (films, GTAs
,
handouts and lesson plans), and participation and training
in a Control Center Team exercise. Past experience with
attempted refresher training courses indicates that the
approach will fail unless the assignment of all primary
MOS 5711 personnel is directed from the Division/Wing Head-
quarters level.
4. Summary of FMF NBC Defense School
Standardization Proposals
It is realized that there may be idiosyncrasies present
in each of the commands and their respective NBC defense
schools which might alter the proposed course lengths and
sequencing schedules. In order to establish a system of
standardization, an interest must first be generated and steps
initiated at Headquarters, Marine Corps to convene a symposium
of Marine Corps educators and NBC defense school personnel.
The major issue to be resolved would entail the standardiza-
tion of all facets of current Marine Corps NBC defense school-
ing, and the implementation of a standardized NBC defense
refresher course curricula. This would include agreement
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on the course length, proper sequence of courses, uniform
POIs, and instructor training procedures.
B. FMF NBC DEFENSE TRAINING STANDARDIZATION
Historically, the majority of casualties attributable to
NBC warfare have been due principally to a lack of troop train-
ing, indoctrination, and discipline as opposed to the effective-
ness of the agents and skills of enemy employment. It is
postulated by the authors that the present Marine Corps NBC
defense training program lacks the direction and substance
required to provide units trained in NBC defense matters fully
capable of operating within an NBC environment.
NBC defense training is presented throughout the formal
training spectrum of the Marine Corps; entry- level training
for both enlisted Marines and officers provides a basic intro-
duction to NBC defense and its associated peculiarities. Post
entry-level training provides each Marine with skills, know-
ledge, and attitudes necessary to the unit mission. Essential
subjects mastery is but one part of the training required to
ensure optimal survival on the battlefield; the mission-oriented
training which is conducted by unit commanders must integrate
all available knowledge and skills, and provide the leadership
so vital to mission accomplishment. It is at this stage that
the Marine Corps NBC defense training program falters. In
actual organization training and operations, no other subject
receives more lip service than NBC defense.
To provide qualified instructors and personnel for the
Marine Corps, each Marine must receive the training and
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background knowledge to set the stage for his endeavors within
his respective occupational field. As it is currently organ-
ized, only U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School graduates are
considered qualified to provide NBC defense training for
Marines, An examination of recent Marine Corps utilization
of this school shows a decline in usage over recent years,
particularly in light of the relatively stable T/0 and size
of Marine Corps organizations. Table XIII provides total
Marine Corps participation at the U.S. Army Ordnance Center
and School beginning in July 1970.
An interesting factor in discussing OF 57 is that the
field depends solely on lateral moves for its manpower base.
The OF 57 monitor at Headquarters, Marine Corps, is a Gunnery
Sergeant holding an Intelligence (OF 02) MOS . He serves as
the monitor for approximately 750 OF 02 Marines and for the
approximately 275 OF 57 Marines. As T/O billets in OF 57 are
provided only for the ranks of Corporal (E-4) through Master
Sergeant (E-8), a void within the field exists on each end of
the grade scale. For the OF 57 Gunnery Sergeant, future pro-
motion depends highly on his capabilities in areas other than
OF 57, thus a high migration toward redesignation as a First
Sergeant (E-8) occurs wherein a reasonable promotional oppor-
tunity exists to Sergeant Major (E-9). There is no recruit
input to the school, and therefore no continuity of training
or background within the field among junior Marines. Lateral
moves into OF 57 are normally Corporals or Sergeants who
reenlist under a school option. According to the OF 57 Enlisted
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Monitor, upon completion of MOS 5711 training, the new trainee
is then transferred to a Monitored Command and assigned as to
duty station only.
Marines who reenlist under the Selective Reenlistment
Bonus Program (SRBP) are assigned to an MOS 5711 billet (with
certain exceptions authorized by CMC) for their entire enlist-
ment. Those Marines who graduate from the U.S. Army Ordnance
Center and School are assigned to an MOS 5711 billet for a
minimum of one year immediately following school. Marine Corps
directives provide adequate policy guidance concerning assign-
ment of Marines. These policies, in effect, require the
Commanding General or Commanding Officer to assign the Marine
with MOS 5711 to a billet where his training will (theoretically)
be utilized. Once assigned to such a billet, however, the Marine
may find that his "other" duties restrict the time he can allot
to NBC defense duties. It is the experience of the authors
that such is the case in the majority of MOS 5711 assignments
within both battalion and squadron organizations. There is no
set policy of assignment for the OF 57 Marine with the exception
of assignment to the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) area, where he
will be rotated as an OF 57 to fulfill WESTPAC requirements.
For a fortunate few Marines, assignment to a Marine NBC defense
school provides the opportunity to reinforce his previous
knowledge and training and stay abreast of current NBC defense




A recommended approach to NBC defense training is to
remove the subject from the training schedule as a separate
entity and force its integration with other subjects and unit
training. Implementation in such a manner would demand a
cognizant attitude and NBC defense equipment familiarity and
usage would become second nature. The use of all available
NBC defense equipment on every field exercise, with particular
emphasis placed on the FPM, would provide first hand knowledge
of the capabilities and operating limitations and restrictions
associated with all NBC defense items. This approach would
also greatly influence existing attitudes towards NBC defense
training
.
Of all the basic essential subjects, NBC defense appears
to be equally weighted. However, NBC defense is now limited
to classroom application in the majority of units. This need
not be so; there are considerable opportunities to employ NBC
defense equipment in garrison. Field protective mask drills,
inspections, and physical training while wearing the FPM are
all viable alternatives to canned classroom presentations.
Battalion or squadron field meets can incorporate events which
are performed while wearing the FPM. Each has the dual purpose
of maintaining consciousness regarding the importance of NBC
defense equipment and re- emphasizing the breathing, communi-
cations, movement, and sight restrictions while undergoing
strenuous physical exercise.
Every commanding officer should be concerned with his
unit's NBC defense capabilities, and simulating NBC operating
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conditions in the field will enable him to observe the effects
that usage of NBC defense equipment places on alertness, com-
munications, stamina, and weapon accuracy of his Marines.
Problems encountered in the field, particularly in such areas
as non- functional equipment and improper care, fitting, and
maintenance of the FPM, cannot be resolved on the battlefield.
The actual use of CS by aggressor forces will rapidly sharpen
masking discipline and simultaneously place a dependency upon
the benefits derived from proper FPM care and maintenance.
The short-lasting field effects of CS are ideal for exercise
employment without the accompanying liability of serious
personal injury.
The integration of NBC defense training into field exer-
cises and operations should pose no major problem for ingenious
Marines. This requires only the consent of higher headquarters
and an honest critique following the use of any NBC scenario
introduced into any operation to remedy any shortcomings.
The major excuse for not implementing such exercises in the
past has centered on preparation for low- or mid- intensity
conflicts where no NBC capabilities are expected; this argument
is no longer valid. The argument that the arbitrary introduc-
tion of NBC warfare into training exercises eliminates or
reduces member participation throughout the remainder of the
exercise is nothing less than total realism in the preparation
for potential Marine operations. The incorporation of real-
istic NBC conditions can be assisted through the use of




Certain training areas can be established expressly for
NBC related exercises. The installation of chemical agent
detection stations will test the immediate proficiency of
Monitor/Survey Team members. Biological samples can be taken
and properly labeled for simulated laboratory analysis. Chemi-
cal decontamination can be practiced by unit Decontamination
Team members, either using existing NBC defense school facilities
or through the establishment of a unit decontamination area and
personal decontamination station. Control Center team exercises
can be conducted both in garrison and in the field, and required
reports and communications can be relayed using organic communi-
cations equipment.
Implementation of NBC defense training into field training
exercises would do much to provide a more realistic battlefield
for potential engagements. Those training exercises contained
in FM 21-48 can be readily implemented to provide this realism.
It is recommended that the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Train-
ing Program at MCB 29 Palms, California, establish a pilot
program to fully implement such an exercise for battalion/
squadron participation. Only through realistic training can
the desired unit NBC defense team and member cohesion be achieved.
The requirement for a monthly NBC defense training period
will maintain the awareness and cultivate the interest neces-
sary to successful unit NBC defense operations. In short,
all Marines must be able to shoot, move, and communicate while
wearing NBC defense equipment. Marine Corps Bulletin 3400 of
27 June 1975 recently advised FMF commanders to include the
use of NBC protective equipment in training whenever possible.
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Suggestions included field exercises, the continuance of
regular maintenance operations, and limited physical train-
ing. This bulletin provided the initial guidance and impetus
for the start of a coherent program, but subsequent events,
exercises, and the lack of a strong NBC defense inspection
program have thus far failed to support this effort.
A related problem concerns Marines assigned to unit NBC
defense teams. Unfortunately, although through no fault of
their own, the majority of Marines trained in the semi-formal
NBC defense schools have less than one year remaining to serve
prior to separation from the Marine Corps. This phenomena is
one of assigning only those "expendable" Marines to the various
assigned school quotas. This is particularly true within the
Marine Aircraft Wing where highly skilled junior-ranking
Marines are considered indispensible . As a result of this
practice, a constant turnover is perpetuated for NBC defense
team assignments and training.
Another area which will impact upon Marine NBC defense
training is the updating and revision of FMFM 11-1, Nuclear,
Chemical and Defensive Biological Operations in the FMF
.
MCDEC , charged with the revision, would do well to examine
the format and presentation contained in U.S. Army FM 100-5,
Operations
,
which presents an easily understood training manual
for use by the enlisted soldier. Adapting this format to a
small-unit approach would provide a much-needed reference for




C. FMF NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS STANDARDIZATION
Situations where Marines are engaged in an amphibious
assault in a nuclear war, are required to maneuver while
contending with contaminated terrain, or are confronted with
the possibility of a tactical nuclear preemptive strike are
as plausible as the Soviet threat is real. Yet, in light of
these potential dangers, our current training does not reflect
any emphasis on fighting a war of movement within an NBC
environment
.
The NBC Defense Annex of a standard operations plan for
any major exercise deals with the employment of NBC weapons.
Invariably, for the vast majority of operations, this annex
states that the use of NBC weapons will not be considered in
the play of the problem. Considering that the professed doc-
trine of the Soviets is to use chemical and nuclear weapons
in a major conflict, this seems to present a paradox. Even
if the avowed purpose of such training is to prepare Marines
for NBC warfare conditions, such recent operations as the
rescue of the S.S. Mayaguez and operations on Koh Tang Island
proved that Marines have to be prepared to operate in the
presence of riot control agents at a minimum. Where does
this leave the Marine Corps in regard to its ability to per-
form in a major war where NBC weapons are in the play of the
problem?
As was noted in the previous section, NBC defense train-
ing must be thorough and, as a corollary, so must be the
integration of NBC defense into operations. Field exercises
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offer the device whereby the tools of NBC defense trade can
be used and the benefits of proper NBC defense training
realized. To have one without the other will contribute to
a lack of unit coordination and a severely degraded performance
under actual NBC combat conditions.
The Marine Corps' failure to realistically plan for oper-
ations utilizing the concepts of NBC warfare has led to undue
optimism in assessing our offensive capability. Marines may
very well one day face the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Forces that
General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
conceded in his Fiscal Year 1978 Posture Statement: "... are
the best equipped and prepared forces in the world to employ
chemical weapons and to operate under CBR warfare conditions."
To ignore this threat and continue to remain oblivious to
their demonstrated NBC capability is to court disaster in the
face of the numerically inferior and out-gunned NATO Forces.
Commanders who have not yet allowed their Marines to encounter
the cumbersome and restrictive movement imparted by NBC defense
equipment, particularly when under strain or duress, had best
begin their preparedness if they wish to successfully accom-
plish their assigned mission in future conflicts.
D. FMF NBC DEFENSE INSPECTION STANDARDIZATION
The present structure of the major inspection programs
conducted within the Marine Corps does not provide the unit
commander with the proper incentives to perform NBC defense
training on a consistent basis. It appears that NBC defense
lectures, essential subjects testing, and gas chamber exercises
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are performed only to meet requirements and establish "filler"
in each Marine's individual training record, rather than
actually provide the training required to ensure combat sur-
vivability under NBC conditions. The NBC defense ready locker
and equipment locker are inspected only for actual content and
compliance with radiac instrument calibration requirements.
Decontamination equipment is often inspected in its original
packing. The practical skills and professional knowledge
possessed by individual Marines is not explored and the paper-
work drill is perpetuated.
In order for an inspection team to accomplish its assigned
task, it must be able to realistically evaluate units in the
performance of the unit's assigned mission. Past inspections
have confirmed the fact that as long as a unit "looks good on
paper" the ultimate result of the inspection will be a grade
of satisfactory or higher. The importance of proper paper
documentation is not being disputed, but the lack of emphasis
on the practical aspects of NBC defense is questioned. This
may seem to imply a reversion to the Operational Readiness
Inspection (ORI) , but that does not necessarily have to be
the case. As an example, a list of NBC defense team members
could be provided to the inspection team. A random selection
of team members for testing, either oral, practical, or written,
will provide a true measure of actual NBC defense capability
and knowledge. This may appear to encompass more detail and
time than is available during a relatively short inspection
period, but this can be readily accomplished by an experienced
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NBC defense inspector. Commands are usually too involved
with some other aspect of training or operations and profess
not to possess the necessary expertise to accomplish required
NBC defense training. Consequently, rather than being a
continuous and consistent training vehicle, the respective
NBC defense programs have been degraded to minimum effort
projects devoted to minimal satisfaction of the cyclical
inspection requirements.
NBC defense inspections must be redesigned in order to
redirect these attitudes and actions. This must begin at the
IGMC level. Unit commanders respect what is inspected, and
the intensity of each inspection sets the stage for all sub-
sequent unit inspection activity. Such inspections should be
aligned with existing command guidance in the NBC defense
field, namely, practical application of team member knowledge,
NBC Defense Officer and NBC Defense Specialist proficiency,
unit training programs, and maximum available use of NBC
defense equipment during field exercises and operations.
E. STANDARDIZATION SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has surveyed the NBC training program and
operational environment that are both exogeneous to and
indigenous to the Marine Corps. It does not attempt to address
those important NBC-related problems which fall outside of
Marine Corps purview, such as the anticipated lack of adequate
medical support which is to be provided by the U.S. Navy.
Such a report is outside the realm of this thesis. Instead,
the strengths of the enemy and inherent weaknesses of the
113

existing system were highlighted only to emphasize the over-
whelming realization that the Marine Corps needs to acquire
a new direction in NBC defense training, operations, and
inspections in order to operate effectively within an NBC
environment.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated in April 1977,
"Operational readiness is the key. All major commands are
now substantially ready for combat, and the Corps is prepared
today to demonstrate that readiness whenever called." General
Wilson's assessment of the overall situation attests to the
fact that the Marines are ready to perform their assigned
mission. The Marines have probably never been so well trained,
equipped, or prepared during any other peacetime situation.
But, as in practically every structure, there exists a weak
link, or modern-day Achilles' heel, and in the opinion of the
authors, the Marine Corps' is NBC defense.
The Marine Corps is presently at a state of readiness
where the immediate implementation of a viable NBC defense
program could be initiated with relative ease. The concept
of centralized control, however, must provide the overriding
theme. To facilitate command attention and handling of all
Marine Corps NBC defense matters, steps must also be taken
to create an NBC position wherein direction can be admin-
istered at Headquarters, Marine Corps.
It is recommended that an NBC Defense Officer be assigned
to the Operations and Training Department of the Policies
Division (Code POL), Headquarters, Marine Corps. The Director,
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Policies Division, assists the Deputy Chief of Staff (DC/S)
for Plans and Policies in the coordination, review, and
development of Marine Corps policies with respect to Marine
Corps roles, mission, function, structure and command rela-
tionships, providing assessments of the consistencies of such
proposals with existing policies and directives. He addition-
ally serves as the Executive Assistant to the DC/S for Plans
and Policies. The Marine Corps has both a mid-range and
long-range plan for where it wants to go; it is time that NBC
defense be implemented in this plan. The NBC Defense Officer
thus assigned would be in a position of planning and coordina-
tion, and would provide a point of contact and "sounding
board" for all Marine Corps NBC defense matters, a position
that is not in existence today. While the proposed billet
would be concerned primarily with NBC defense, it would be
advantageous to have this officer also hold MOS 5715, and
coordinate those related items of Nuclear and Chemical Warfare
Employment (N§CWE) interest and concern. He would additionally
serve as a coordinator for IGMC inspections in the area of NBC
defense
.
It is recommended that the IGMC incorporate an immediate
capability to inspect and enforce existing NBC defense direc-
tives. This will set the tone for subordinate inspections and
provide a stepping stone to future NBC defense endeavors for
the entire Marine Corps.
A recent Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the U.S. Army
Ordnance Center and School stated, "One of the most frustrating
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experiences for those Marines who attend courses here is the
lack of concern and attention they find in their units when
they return with the knowledge and information they have
learned." Career motivation seriously wanes upon their dis-
covery that they will serve as Training NCOs in their S-3
Sections until a major inspection approaches, and only then
are they relinquished to devote all their time and energies
to NBC defense matters.
Marine Corps Bulletin 1220 of 9 December 1976 and 27 June
1977 provides a realistic indicator of current job satisfac-
tion among junior OF 57 Marines. For the six-month periods
ending 30 September 1976 and 50 April 1977, the field was
short Lance Corporals through Sergeants, balanced in Staff
Sergeants, over in Gunnery Sergeants, and balanced in Master
Sergeants. The annual OF 57 reenlistment goal has been estab-
lished at 147; for the respective six-month periods, four
reenlistments during the first period and 27 reenlistments
during the second period provided 2.7% and 18.4% of the desired
reenlistments. Of 40 OFs within the Marine Corps, OF 57 was
ranked 39th in reenlistments. Only OF 46 (Photography), a
relatively small OF, had registered a lower reenlistment
percentage (18.0%).
The Fiscal Year 1977 Warrant Officer Selection Board
selected one MOS 5711 Master Sergeant for promotion to WO-1.
Upon promotion during January 1978, he will be assigned MOS
5702 as a primary MOS. It is opined that increased utiliza-
tion of superior MOS 5711 Marines in a Warrant Officer capacity
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would greatly bolster the OF 57 image and correspondingly
contribute to increased NBC defense readiness and effective-
ness .
This thesis would not be complete without emphasizing
once again the foremost problem associated with NBC defense
in the Marine Corps today: attitude. Not only is it prev-
alent among officers and enlisted alike, it is also the most
difficult to correct. If this deficient command interest is
not redirected to the areas of threat analysis, inherent
dangers, and the ultimate results of non-compliance with NBC
procedures and regulations, the consequences may become too
apparent when actual NBC conditions are encountered by Marine
Corps units. General Wilson's observation that "true readiness
ultimately rests upon the quality and motivation of our per-
sonnel" may well prove the determining factor in the future





PROPOSED FMF MONITOR/ SURVEY AND DECONTAMINATION COURSE
Length of School 10 Days




PT (1630-1700 MWF) 2.
5
Admin Time (1630-1700 Tuesday) /Field Day 2.0
(1630-1700 Thursday 13.0
NUCLEAR
Nuclear Defense Instruction 20.0
Quizzes § Critiques (3 @ . 5 Hr) 1.5
Exam § Critique 2.0
BIOLOGICAL
Biological Defense Instruction 5.5
Quizzes $ Critique (1 § . 5 Hr) 0.5
Exam § Critique 1.0
CHEMICAL
Chemical Defense Instruction 20.0
Quizzes § Critiques (3 @ . 5 Hr) 1.5
Exam % Critique 2.0
EXIT PROCEDURES
Final Exam (Practical) 3.5
Final Exam § Critique 3.5












PROPOSED FMF NBC DEFENSE OFFICER/SNCO/ENLISTED COURSE





PT (1630-17Q0 MWF) 5.0
Admin Time (1630-1700 Tuesday) Field Day
(1630-1700 Thursday) 4.0
NUCLEAR
Nuclear Defense Instruction 52.0
Quizzes § Critiques (5 @ .5 Hr) 2.5
Exam § Crituque 2.5
BIOLOGICAL
Biological Defense Instruction 7.0
Quiz § Critique (1 @ .5 Hr) 0.5
Exam $ Critique 1.0
CHEMICAL
Chemical Defense Instruction 30.0
Quizzes $ Critiques (5 @ .5 Hr) 2.5
Ex am § Critique 1.5
EXIT PROCEDURES
Exercises § Review 21.0
Final Exam $ Critique 4.5
Course Critique/Graduation $ Check-out 3.0 00 c
Total Hours 145.
5






MARINE GRADUATES AT THE U.S. ARMY ORDNANCE CENTER AND SCHOOL
FY 19 71 THROUGH FY 197 8 (PROJECTED)
Fiscal Year CBR Officer Course CBR Enlisted Course *
1971 36 88
1972 11 69
1973 No figures available




1977 (to 19 August) 1 42
1978 (Projected) 6 68
* includes Marine Corps Reserves.
Table XIII - Marine Graduates at the U.S. Army
Ordnance Center and School,




ESSENTIAL SKILLS/TASKS FOR UNIT
NBC DEFENSE OFFICERS/NCO ' S"
1. Recognize types, characteristics, persistency and physio-
logical effects of chemical and riot control agents.
2. Perform first aid for chemical agent casualties.
3. Supervise first aid procedures for chemical and RCA.
4. Recognize technical aspects of biological defense.
5. Recognize factors concerning employment of biological
weapons
.
6. Take individual/unit defensive measures against biological
attack.
7. Recognize the types of nuclear explosions and describe
effects
8. Take individual defensive measures before/during/after
nuclear attack.
9. Fit and adjust protective mask.
10. Don, clear, and seat protective mask.
11. Recognize conditions requiring automatic masking.
12. Conduct unmasking procedures.
13. Maintain protective mask/carrier.
14. Use accessories authorized for protective mask M17 series.
15. Conduct mask confidence training.
16. Supervise use of individual protective clothing and equip-
ment.
17. Determine MQPP.
18. Recognize personal needs under MOPP.





20. Perform biological decontamination of self, clothing,
and equipment.
21. Perform radiological decontamination of self, clothing,
and equipment.
22. Recognize NBC standards of proficiency (individual, unit,
team)
.
23. Define duties of unit NBC defense personnel.
24. Establish unit NBC teams.
25. Prepare NBC reports.
26. Conduct chemical detection and identification operations.
27. Supervise marking of contaminated areas.
28. Cross chemically contaminated area.
29. Supervise employment of chemical agent alarms.
30. Determine parameters of nuclear strikes.
31. Prepare simplified and detailed fallout predictions.
32. Use radiac equipment (includes OEG)
.
33. Perform radiological monitoring.
34. Conduct ground radiological survey.
35. Plot NBC 5 messages and contamination overlays.
36. Analyze fallout contamination data.
37. Discuss origin and hazards of neutron- induced radiation.
38. Supervise use of collective protective equipment.
39. Supervise equipment decontamination.
40. Determine requirement for decontaminating equipment.
41. Establish field expedient personnel decontaminating
station (PDS)
.
42. Conduct individual NBC defense proficiency testing.
43. Conduct unit NBC defense proficiency testing.
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44. Conduct unit NBC defense training.
45. Advise on flame support of tactical operations.
46. Analyze unit mission to determine smoke support require
ments
.
47. Prepare NBC annex to unit SOP.





The comparison of the historical and experimental scores
(Tables I and II) on each question constitutes a set of paired
observations. Also, since the sample sizes are both less than
30, the "t" distribution, with a "single tail" confidence
level of 95%, will be used to test the hypothesis that the
means are equal.
H : the means are equal
o n
H : the means are not 'equal
c = particular change for each question
c = average change
S = estimated variance
S— = estimated standard deviation
c
n = sample size
k = confidence interval

































c 2 2299. Q8 Q9 inS
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S_ = iiM = 1.682
c /I9
c = k S
n = 28
k - 2.05
c = 78 * 54
2 4073 47
S = no V = 150.86c 28-1
S = 12. 282
c




c = k S_
c = (2.05) (1.682)
c = 3.45
-5.10 } 3.45
.'. accept H : The means
o iare equal
c = (2.05) (2.32)
C = 4.75
.54 } 4.75






The absolute cost saving for the proposed alternative can
be emphasized by use of the regular military compensation
(RMC) for the three days of instruction eliminated. The Army
Force Planning Cost Handbook and the FY7 5 student input load
were used to compute the total cost saving.
RMC X 3 DAYS X FY 7 5 INPUT ~ TOTAL
E/4/E5 43.37 3 6172 = $803,039




This total does not include the relative cost savings
incurred when the faculty RMC and the facilities costs
reduction are taken into account. The actual computation




WRITTEN NBC TEST RESULTS
Personnel Passing
Elapsed Weeks
A Sample Group Average
B Group Average - units with little or no NBC
training emphasis.




NBC DEFENSE BILLET DESCRIPTIONS
MPS MPS Description DPP Code
5702 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense 2G (111)
Officer
*5710 Marine Wing Weapons Unit Cfficer 4B
*5715 Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Employment 2G
Pff icer
*5720 Ground Nuclear Weapons Assembly Pfficer 4E
5700 Basic Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 494
Defense Man (MGYSGT-PVT)
5711 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense 494
Specialist (MGYSGT-PVT)
*5712 Chemical Technical Escort (GYSGT-PVT) 494
Notes: (111) MPS ' s suitable for assignment as primary
for Warrant Pfficers.
* MPS's to be assigned as additional only.
Assignment of either MPS 5702 or MPS 5711 requires the
successful completion of the respective officer or enlisted
NBC defense curriculum (four weeks in duration) presented at
the U.S. Army Crdnance Center and School, Aberdeen, Maryland.
MPS 5702 and MPS 5711 deal directly with NBC defense matters
within each organization and provide the backbone of that
organization's NBC defense expertise. An examination of the
MOS description of each MOS will provide an insight to the





A. MOS 5702: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE OFFICER
(NBC Def 0) (111)
1. MOS Description
a. Summary: Supervises and coordinates operational
and technical activities associated with nuclear, biological,
and chemical defense.
b. Duties and Tasks: Prepares plans, annexes, and
standing operating procedures for nuclear, biological, and
chemical defense. Estimates requirements and makes recommen-
dations for procurement and distribution of NBC defense training
and exercises. Assists in planning and supervising NBC defense
training and exercises, coordinates and supervises NBC defense
activities, to include: predictions, detection, evaluation,
and monitoring of NBC attacks and hazards, and decontamination
of personnel, equipment, material, and areas. Advises commander
on vulnerability of own forces to NBC attack. Prepares initial
assessment of damage to own forces resulting from enemy NBC
attack. In conjunction with medical officer, obtains and
evaluates information concerning tactically significant dosages
of nuclear radiation received by platoon size or larger units.
Advises and assists the intelligence officer in collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of information concerning enemy
NBC capabilities.
2. T/0 Billet Titles
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Officer
Radiological Defense Officer





B. MOS 5711: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE
SPECIALIST CNBC Def Spl) MGYSGT through PVT
1. MOS Description
a. Summary: Performs duties incident to operation
of NBC Element including operation and maintenance of NBC
protective equipment, and supervision and training of NBC
defense personnel.
b. Duties and Tasks: Performs duties incident to
applying detection, emergency and decontamination measures
to terrain, equipment, and personnel contaminated by NBC war-
fare agents. Uses, or supervises personnel engaged in using
detection equipment for toxic chemical agents and radiac
instruments for measuring radioactive contamination. Detects
the presence of chemical agents and makes identification of
the agent. Detects the presence of radioactive contamination
and measures the radiation intensity. Collects samples for
detection, and identification of biological agents. Informs
unit commanders of contaminated areas, and suggests routes of
passage, supervises or participates in decontaminating affected
areas, equipment, and personnel, using portable and power
driven decontaminating equipment and protective clothing.
Determines by tests when contamination areas or equipment have
been rendered harmless. Assists in interpreting information
received from monitoring teams to determine the extent of
contamination and radiation intensity. Inspects and performs
preventive maintenance on chemical warfare protective equipment
such as protective masks, collective protectors, and decontam-
ination equipment. Supervises and conducts training in
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detection and protection phases of NBC warfare, including
operation, employment and care of NBC detection and measuring
equipment and decontamination equipment.
2. T/0 Billet Titles




NBC DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND DECONTAMINATION
The following NBC defense equipment is available for Fleet
Marine Force organizations and units, providing a total protec-
tion package for any foreseeable NBC contingency.
A. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
All defense measures must consider protection of the eyes,
mouth, nose, and skin, as these are the common portals of
entry by NBC agents or weapons. Individual protective equip-
ment must provide sufficient protection to enable continuation
of the assigned mission and concurrently ensure the optimum
probability of survival following any NBC attack. During
entry-level training Marines are fitted for Field Protective
Masks (FPM) and items of protective clothing, both of which
are issued or assigned for individual use, as required, within
Fleet Marine Force organizations. Individual protective equip-
ment available in the Fleet Marine Force includes:
1. FPM ABC-M17A1
The FPM ABC-M17A1 provides protection for the wearer's
face, eyes, and respiratory tract from field concentrations of
all NBC agents in gas, aerosol, and fine droplet form (Tank
crewmen use the ABC-M14A2 and ABC-M25/M25A1 series of tank
masks and aircraft crewmen use the M24 aircraft protective
masks with respective accessories). The FPM ABC-M17A1 is
issued in three sizes, small, medium, and large, and is comple-
mented by the following mask accessories:
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a. ABC-M6A2 CB Protective Mask Hood
This hood is designed for semi-permanent attach-
ment to the FPM ABC-M17A1 to provide protection to the head
and neck from chemical agent vapors or liquid droplets and
increases protection to the respiratory tract by minimizing
the effects of leakage around the edges of the mask. The
eyelenses of the FPM ABC-M17A1 are further protected by a pair
of Ml Eyelens Outserts which improve operations in low temper-
atures .
2 . M15A1 Field Protective Mask Carrier
This carrier is made of olive drab cotton duck and is
lined with olive drab cotton cloth. It is reinforced at criti-
cal locations by plastic material and is provided with four
pockets, a shoulder strap and a waist strap. The four pockets
are used to carry:
a. Amyl Nitrite Ampules
These ampules are issued from medical sources supply
for use in counteracting the effects of blood agent poisoning.
Normal issue is one box of 12 ampules.
b. Automatic Atropine Injector
Three automatic atropine injectors are issued from
medical sources supply for first aid against nerve agent poison-
ing.
c. Chemical Agent Detector Paper, ABC M-8
A booklet of 25 sheets of chemical agent detector
paper is issued for detection of liquid nerve or blister
chemical agents. Instructions for use are provided on the
cover of the booklet.
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d. Ml Waterproofing Bag
The Ml waterproofing bag is provided to protect
the FPM ABC-MI 7A1 filter elements against dampness. Under
field conditions, two bags are issued: one to store the mask
in and another to encapsulate the M15A1 FPM carrier and
enclosed FPM ABC-M17A1 while crossing water or operating under
extreme moisture conditions.
e. Mask Spectacle Inserts
Spectacle inserts are available for all Marines
with visual acuity of 20/70 or poorer, and after issue become
the personal property of the individual. Regulations for
spectacle inserts are contained in U.S. Navy BUMED Instruction
6810.4.
f. Water Canteen Cap
This cap provides the capability of drinking water
from the canteen while masked, and is stored in the internal
pocket of the M15A1 FPM carrier when not in use.
g. Ml Resuscitation Tube
The Ml resuscitation tube provides the capability
of administering mask-to-mouth artificial respiration by a
masked individual to an individual casualty in a contaminated
atmosphere.
3. ABC-M4 CB Mask Winterizat ion Kit
This kit provides protection against frost accumulation
on the inlet valve caps under arctic conditions. It is stored
in the internal pocket of the M15A1 FPM carrier when not in use
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4. ABC-M13 Decontaminating and Reimpregnat ing Kit
This kit is contained in a plastic container equipped
with a pull-off plastic lid. It consists of two cloth bags
filled with a decontaminating and reirapregnating compound for
use in decontaminating individual clothing and equipment and
for emergency reimpregnation of the chemical protective liner,
gloves, and socks worn in chemically contaminated areas. It
also contains a small pad filled with skin decontaminating
powder, and a single-edge blade for cutting away contaminated
clothing. Any chemical agent that has not penetrated the skin
may be decontaminated with the skin decontaminating powder, as
may any agent on the skin. This is accomplished by blotting
any liquid first with the pad, turning the pad over and slap-
ping it on the skin to release the powder and rubbing the
powder over the contaminated area. The FPM ABC-M17A1 may also
be decontaminated, either internally or externally, using these
procedures. The kit is carried in the large external pocket
of the M15A1 FPM carrier.
5
.
M-2 Leather Dressing, Vesicant Gas Resistant
This is a protective dubbing, provided in a small metal
can, that makes leather resistant to penetration by chemical
agents. It is applied to boots either by hand-rubbing or via
immersion in a melted solution.
6. Chemical Protective Clothing
A complete set of vesicant gas protective clothing
(trousers, shirt, pair of gloves and socks) is available for
issue to each Marine. Normally, a specified percentage
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(usually 10%) of all chemical protective clothing will be kept
impregnated at all times. Periodic testing with the ABC-M2
Impregnite- in-Clothing Testing Kit will determine the
impregnite content. When required, the stock specified will
be reimpregnated using the M3 Field Impregnation Set.
B. COLLECTIVE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
Some means of collective protection is required to remove
chemical and biological agents and radioactive material, in
particular form from contaminated air. The ABC-M6 series of
Gas Particulate Filter Units provides this capability. These
gas driven units are used in conjunction with either a permanent,
improvised, or portable sealed shelter. Materials for sealing
existing shelters are obtained from respective engineer/util-
ities units or sections. They provide uncontaminated facili-
ties for the rest and relief of personnel and for command and
communications facilities. TM 3-4240-20-17 provides maintenance
instructions for the operating and care of M6 units. Structures
most likely to be made resistant to NBC agents are those housing
command posts, aid stations, communication centers, fire direc-
tion centers, and other military activities of similar impor-
tance. Equipment necessary to the proper installation and
adaptation of the M6 series of filter units are the AN-M1 and
M2 Antibackdraf t Valve and Ml Air Pressure Regulator. A U-tube
manometer is used to determine the overpressure within the




C. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT
Rapid detection and identification of chemical agents and
radiological material or nuclear contamination is vital to
unit survival. At the present time, the Fleet Marine Force
does not possess an immediate detection capability for bio-
logical agents; samples must be collected in the field and
tested in the nearest laboratory to determine if biological
agents have been employed by enemy forces. For chemical and
radiological/nuclear contamination detection, the following
equipment is available to determine the type of contaminant
present and the extent of its coverage.
1 . Chemical Equipment
a. ABC-M18A2 Chemical Agent Detector Kit
This kit will detect dangerous vapor concentrations
of all known nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents, as well
as detect residual surface contamination. Detector tubes,
tickets, paper and vesicant crayon are used to detect the
presence of chemical agents. The presence of a chemical agent
is detected by distinct color changes.
b. AN-M15A2 Chemical Agent Detector Kit
This kit possesses all of the component parts of
the ABC-M18A2 kit with the exception of those items required
to perform tests 5 through 8 of enclosure (8) of the ABC-
M18A2 kit and the testing for liquid agents with the M7A1
detector crayon.
c. Vesicant Detector Crayon, M7A1
Used as a separate component from the M18 series
of chemical agent detector kits, the M7A1 vesicant detector
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crayon is rubbed on equipment or on a piece of paper to detect
blister agent contamination. Liquid or high vapor concentra-
tions of blister agents (except the nitrogen mustards) turn
the crayon from pink to blue.
d. Chemical Agent Detector Paper, ABC-M8
This liquid detector consists of blotter-like paper
impregnated with chemicals which furnish the detection mechan-
ism. Issued in a booklet with 25 sheets per book, or furnished
with the ABC-M18A2/AN-M15A2 kits, the ABC-M8 paper provides
recognition of G and V nerve agents and blister agents via a
distinctive color change on contact with the respective agents.
2. Radiological/Nuclear Contamination Equipment
Radiac instruments are used to detect the presence of
radioactivity and measure the dose or dose rate of radioactive
contamination following a nuclear accident, detonation, or
sabotage by radiological materials.
a. Dose-Rate Meters
Dose-rate meters are radiac- instruments which
measure the level of radioactivity in a contaminated area
through the electrical collection of ions principle.
(1) IM-174/PD. Radiacmeter IM-174/PD consists of
a radiacmeter, housed in a waterproof aluminum case, a vinyl
impregnated nylon carrying case with a clear plastic viewing
window and belt clip, and a canvas carrying strap. The
radiacmeter is normally operated within the carrying case and
may be carried by either the shoulder strap or the belt clip.
It is the standard high dose rate area survey meter for the

Marine Corps and measures only gamma radiation on two range
scales, 0.1 to 10 rad per hour and to 500 rad per hour.
It provides accuracy within plus or minus 10 percent and
operates from power provided by three mercury batteries, pro-
viding up to 150 operating hours, depending on the age, type
of storage before use, and climatic conditions during use.
(2) AN/PDR-27. Radiac set AN/PDR-27 series are
portable, watertight, battery-operated radiation detectors
and indicators. It is capable of detecting and measuring
gamma radiation, or with a special beta shield removed, of
detecting beta radiation. It is the standard low dose rate
radiac instrument for the Marine Corps, and measures gamma
radiation in millirad per hour. The large Geiger-Mueller (GM)
tube which is housed on the large probe with the attached beta
shield can detect and measure gamma radiation with the shield
closed or detect beta radiation with the shield open on two
range scales; to 0.5 and to 5.0 millirad per hour. The
small GM tube housed in the small probe can also detect and
measure gamma radiation on two range scales: to 50.0 and
to 500.0 millirad per hour. This set is used for monitoring
personnel, food, and equipment.
(3) AN/PDR-54/56. This is a portable alpha radi-
ation detector which uses propane gas in its detecting element
and reads in counts per minute. It is powered by mercury
batteries and normally found in T/E's for organizations posses-
sing a nuclear capability. Its primary use is determining the
amount of alpha radiation contamination present following a




Dosimeters are small, portable devices which
measure the total gamma radiation dose received by an indi-
vidual. They require recharging on a near-daily basis to
ensure accuracy within plus or minus 10 percent.
(1) IM-9C/PD. The IM-9C/PD is a technical dosi-
meter used primarily in laboratory work. It measures gamma
radiation dosage from to 200 millirad. The PP-354/PD radiac
detector-charger is required to recharge the instrument to zero
for subsequent usage following any gamma radiation exposure.
(2) IM-143/PD. The IM-143/PD is a tactical
dosimeter which measures gamma radiation dosage from to 600
rads. It is normally issued on the basis of one per squad or
one per team member of monitor/survey or decontamination teams.
The PP-354/PD radiac detector charger is also required to
recharge this dosimeter to zero.
(3) Radiac Detector DT-60/PD. The DT-60/PD is
the standard dosimeter for the Marine Corps and is issued on
an individual basis to each Marine. It measures gamma radia-
tion in rad in the 200 to 600 rad range, utilizing a lumin-
escence principle of operation, and is accurate to plus or
minus 20 percent. A CP-95 A/PD Computer- Indicator is required
to read the DT-60/PD, and once used, the dosimeter is disposed.
The CP-95 A/PD runs on 115 volt AC only, and operates by focus-
ing a beam of ultra-violet light onto the crystal-detecting
element of the DT-6Q-PD, measuring the resulting orange light




Marine Corps T/E's provide items of NBC defense equipment
and material capable of handling first and second echelon
decontamination.
1. First Echelon Decontamination
This is decontamination held by the individual on
himself and his personal gear, and possibly on his assigned
equipment
.
a. Biological Decontamination Equipment
The field protective mask, immunization programs,
and the practice of good area sanitation and personal hygiene
provide the only individual protection available against bio-
logical agents. Soap and water are used, either at a personnel
decontamination station (PDS) or on an individual basis, to
remove biological agents from the skin, equipment, and gear.
b. Chemical Decontamination Equipment
The following items are available for individual
decontamination:
(1) M15 Decontaminating and Reimpregnating Kit.
The Chloromide powder contained in the two bags provided are
the active decontaminating ingredient of this previously
described kit.
(2) M5 Vesicant Agent Protective Ointment. Al-
though replaced by the M13 kit, numerous issues of M5 kits are
still available for use by many FMF units. Three tubes of
ointment provide a neutralizing capability against mustard
and V agents. It can be used by direct application to the
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skin before exposure as a protective ointment or is applied
after exposure as a decontaminant
.
(3) Water. Flushing the eyes or skin with water,
or water and soap, if available, will assist in removing most
chemical agents, as well as dilute the agent to a less effective
state.
c. Nuclear Decontamination Equipment
The two methods available to the individual in
reducing or eliminating nuclear contamination are:
CI) Brushing
.
Removal of dry, loosely-held
particles using brushes, brooms, or any convenient equipment
from the skin or clothing. This will reduce, but not totally
eliminate, existing contamination; in effect, it only moves
the radioactive material to another location.
(2) Water. Water, particularly when hot and used
in conjunction with soap, will reduce contamination, employing
the physical movement of the contamination by the force of the
water and the movement of soluble isotopes in solution. Once
again, waste control must be contained. The use of a personnel
decontamination station (PDS) or the individual removal of
radioactive materials with water is the most effective method
of personnel decontamination.
2 . Second Echelon Decontamination
Second echelon decontamination is decontamination per-
formed by unit Decontamination Team personnel under supervision
of trained NBC defense personnel, using T/E equipment and
material held by the unit.
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a. Decontamination Team NBC Defense Equipment
In addition to the detection and identification
equipment previously described, Decontamination Team members
are provided with the following specialized items of clothing
and equipment:
(1) CBR M9A1 Mask. This mask provides rapid
cannister removal and replacement for continuous work within
a toxic environment. It is provided with a waterproofing bag,
cannister, carrier and anti-dim cloth.
(2) M3 Toxicological Agents Protective Suit
(Mask, Hood, Coveralls, and Gloves). The M3
impermeable protective clothing does not allow passage of air
through its butyl coated fabric, and is intended primarily for
protection of personnel engaged in extremely hazardous decon-
tamination work or in other special operations involving
spillage or splashes of liquid chemical agents. It is suffic-
iently durable to withstand normal use and decontamination in
the field. Liquid contamination should be either neutralized
or removed from the clothing immediately as penetration is
possible.
(3) Covers, Boot, Toxicological Agents Protective.
Boot covers are worn over all boots except butyl rubber boots;
in areas of gross contamination, boot covers will be worn over
butyl rubber boots also.
(4) Boots, Knee, Heavy Butyl Rubber.
(5
)
Suit, Cooling, Toxicological Agent Protective
(with Hood Cooling Cover)T This suit and
cover are worn over the M5 impermeable clothing under conditions
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of warm weather. The cooling suit is kept moist, normally
by spraying of water, to provide evaporative cooling for the
wearer.
(6) Repair Kit, Toxicological Agents. This kit
is similar to an automobile tube repair kit and is used to
repair small holes and tears in the M3 impermeable clothing.
(7) Type II (General Supply) Equipment. Type II
equipment is provided as dictated by each unit's assigned
mission. Common Type II items for Decontamination Team use
are
:
Long handle shovels Engineer and masking tape
Scrub brushes Rags
Iron rakes 6-quart pails
Brooms 16- and 32-gallon cans with
Buckets covers
Chalk and Detergent
grease pencils Immersion heater
(8) ABC-Mil Decontamination Apparatus. The
ABC-Mil is a 1-1/2 quart, portable decontaminating apparatus.
This unit is charged by a nitrogen gas cylinder, and uses DS-2
as its active decontaminating agent. Filled, it possesses a
135 square foot spray coverage area. It is used primarily to
decontaminate vehicles, and upon application of the DS-2, the
spray is allowed to set for 50 minutes, and is then flushed
with water.
(9) M12A1 Power-Driven Decontamination
Apparatus (PDDAjT The M12A1 consists of a
tank unit, a personnel shower assembly, a pump and hose unit,
and an M2 water heater. It may be either mounted on an M35A2
truck for portable use or left skid-mounted for permanent or
semi-permanent decontamination use. Used in conjunction with
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a large 500-gallon capacity mixing tank, it can be used td
spray super tropical bleach (STB) slurry to decontaminate
large equipment, and provides a decontamination capability
on a scale much larger than available using unit Decontamin-
ation Teams. It may also be used to provide a 24-man shower
facility for PDS use. A crew of four Marines is required for
proper operation.
3. NBC Decontamination
A decontaminant is any material that is used to remove,
absorb, make harmless, or destroy contamination. Department
of the Army Technical Manual 3-220 provides complete instruc-
tions and information on all NBC decontamination and decon-
taminants
.
a. Biological Agent Decontamination
Individuals involved in biological decontamination
operations must wear an FPM and protective clothing. Normal
PDS procedures are followed upon completion of the decontam-
ination. The following type of decontaminants are available.
(1) Natural Decontaminants :
(a) Weather. Low humidity dessicates and
direct infrared and ultraviolet rays from the sun will kill
most biological agents within one day.
(b) Water. Water flushes biological agents
from the surface of materials. Washing with soap and boiling
are two effective ways of eliminating biological agents.
(c) Earth. Earth can be used to cover or
bury biological contamination. Either hand equipment and tools
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or mechanical devices may be used to cover biological
contamination.
(d) Fire and Dry Heat. Fire and dry heat
will both effectively eliminate a biological contaminant.
Pressure heating will increase the effectiveness of dry heat-
ing; temperatures to 335°F. for two to three hours will totally




chemicals are applied as vapors:
(a) Decontaminating Agent, Biological,
BPL (Beta-Propiol acetone). This is the
standard agent for decontamination of the interior of buildings
It is applied with any spray apparatus as a vapor. Contact for
a two (2) hour period is required at 70°F. or above; the
exposure time must be doubled for each 18° Fahrenheit below
70°F. Aeration is required for 4 to 24 hours following
decontamination.
(b) Formaldehyde Solution, U.S. P. (Formalin).
Formalin is used as a field expedient when BPL is not available
One quart is sprayed per 1000 cubic feet of space. Vapors
should be allowed to stand for up to 16 hours and followed
by a minimum 24-hour aeration period.
(c) Ethylene Oxide (ETO) . This is a highly
penetrating vapor used on the basis of 30 pounds of ETO for
each 1000 cubic feet at 75° Fahrenheit for a period of six to
eight hours. Either the amount of ETO or the contact time
must be doubled for each 2Q°F. drop in temperature. Due to
its explosive characteristics, ETO is not used for
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decontamination of building interiors. Clothing decontamin-
ated with ETO must be aerated for 18 to 24 hours before wearing
C_d] Carboxide. This is a mixture of ETO and
carbon dioxide. It is less effective than ETO and must be
used for twice the time of ETO. Its primary use is in
decontamination of building interiors.
(e) Methyl Bromide. Methyl bromide is issued
in ampule form and five ampules are required per delousing bag
for a minimum of 12 hours. Decontaminated items must be
aerated for two hours following decontamination. It is nor-
mally used when ETO is not available and is especially useful
for decontaminating leather and woolen items.
(f) Peracetic Acid (PAA) . PAA is used
against bacteriological spores. Use of a 3% solution is
effective in decontaminating the skin; a 5 to 10 minute con-
tact time is sufficient. PAA provides an effective and safe
solution for FPM decontamination. PAA is highly volatile
(105° Fahrenheit flash point) and requires careful handling.
b. Chemical Agent Decontamination
There are two standard chemical agent decontamin-
ants which are effective not only in use against chemical
agents, but also against biological agents. Both are included
in the following classification.
CI) Standard Decontaminants :
(a) Super Tropical Bleach (STB) . STB is a
chlorinated lime and calcium oxide white powder containing
approximately 30% available chlorine. It destroys mustards,
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arsenicals, and V and G nerve agents by converting them to
harmless or less toxic compounds. STB can be used in a dry
mix (with soil) to decontaminate terrain or as a slurry to
decontaminate wood, rubber, roadways, and concrete. Care must
be taken with its use as it will corrode metals and cannot be
used for personnel decontamination. It can be applied either
manually or with a decontaminating apparatus, but requires
the wearing of protective gloves and FPM.
(b) DS-2. DS-2 is a clear, amber solution
consisting of 7 0% active agent, 28% solvent, and 2% active
agent booster. It is a general purpose, standard decontamin-
ating agent which works on all known chemical agents and most
biological agents within 30 minutes. It is non-corrosive to
most metals, but softens leather, softens or removes old paint,
and may discolor new paint. It is flammable and is a skin
irritant, and is poisonous to breathe. It cannot be used to
decontaminate personnel or masks, and cannot be used with or




number of chemicals and chemical products which have been
authorized for purposes other than decontamination but which
are suitable as decontaminants.
(a) Caustic Soda (Lye) . Lye is used in a
5% solution for G and L agents.
(b) Sodium Hypochlorite (Household Bleach)
.
This is used full strength for H 5 V agents.
(c) Sodium Carbonate (Washing Soda) . This
is used for G agents only.
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(d) Organic and Degreasing Solvents. These
are solvents used for removal of chemical agents only.
Often absorbants, explosives, and heat are
considered as miscellaneous decontaminants , as their use
vaporizes and clears chemical agent contamination, but they
are rarely used specifically for decontamination purposes.
(3) Natural Decontaminants :
(a) Weather. Evaporation and decomposition
are the principal means by which the elements of weather (air,
sunlight ," humidity , and temperature) gradually accomplish
decontamination. It is the simplest of all methods and is
utilized whenever possible.
(b) Water. Flowing water or steam flushes
chemical agents from surfaces and also hydrolizes some agents.
Hot water is generally more effective than cold and the addi-
tion of soap produces an even more effective decontaminant
.
(c) Earth. Earth is used to seal in contam-
ination or as an absorbant for liquid contamination. Covering
an affected area with 10 centimeters of earth provides protec-
tion as long as the earth is not disturbed and the chemical
agent re-exposed.
(d) Fire. Fire destroys or vaporizes liquid
chemical agents. Fire is a rapid, simple, and effective means
of decontaminating terrain or other noncombustible material.
(e) Hot Air. Hot air is used in the decon-
tamination of liquid agents from the delicate instruments of




c. Nuclear and Radiological Decontamination
Nuclear and radiological decontamination is the
process of moving radioactive material from an uncontrolled
location to a controlled location. This contamination is
comprised of particles of dirt or water drops that contain
radioactive materials and which provide a threat to personnel;
this radioactive material must be removed to such a degree that
the contaminated area or object is safe or the hazard is mini-
mized. Radioactivity must be removed because it cannot be
neutralized or destroyed. Potential sources of radioactive
contamination are residual radiation (induced radiation and
fallout) from nuclear weapon detonation, the deliberate use
of radioactive material (radiological agents) , release from a
radioactive source, nuclear accidents, or a nuclear reactor
excursion. The three methods of decontaminating these potential
sources of radiation are:
(1) Aging
.
This is the simplest and most practical
procedure as it reduces the radiation dose to personnel and
requires the least man-hour effort. In practice, it actually
consists of placing a contaminated object in an out-of-way
area, posting the area with the appropriate decontamination
markers and waiting for the radiation to decay to an acceptable
level. This process is periodically checked with radiac
instruments. The time required is a function of the isotope(s)
present and its (their) decay rate(s).
(2) Sealing. Sealing is the process of covering
radiological contamination with a substance which reduces or
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shields the radiation being emitted and/or fixes the contam-
ination in place. Gamma radiation may thus be attenuated and
the emittors fixed in place. The equipment used in sealing
operations will become contaminated and should be decontamin-
ated or disposed of as appropriate. Common sealants are:
(a) Earth. Earth is a temporary sealant
applied over the contaminant in a layer at least 30 centimeters
thick; eight centimeters will reduce the dose rate by approxi-
mately one-half. The operation is most readily accomplished
with earth-moving equipment but shovels may be used if the
contaminated area is small or other equipment is not available.
(b) Asphalt and Concrete. Application of
three centimeters of asphalt or concrete can be applied as a
permanent sealant over roadways or limited land areas; this
process requires the use of road-surfacing equipment and is
relatively expensive.
(c) Grout. Grout is a thin mixture of sand,
cement, and water which is applied over concrete or masonry
surfaces through a spray process or by trowel, rake, or other
expedient tool. A 0.5 centimeter layer is a temporary seal
for all emittors and will shield alpha and beta radiation.
(d) Paint, Varnish, and Plastic. These
materials may be used to seal contamination on or in wood,
concrete, masonry, and metals. They are applied by brush only,






The moving of radiological contam-
ination from areas, food, personnel, water, or equipment to
another location where the contamination will not pose a
hazard is termed removal. Removal requires more time and
effort than either aging or sealing, and is divided into two
categories
:
(a) Dry Methods. Removal procedures using
dry methods of removal depend upon the removal of isotopes in
the same physical and chemical state as that in which they
exist as contaminants. Brushing, vacuuming, abrasion, taping,
earth moving, and stripping and replacing are the common dry
methods used.
(b) Wet Methods. Removal procedures depend
upon the removal of radio isotopes either in the same physical
and chemical state in which they exist as contaminants, making
use of the erosive action of water, or in a physical or chem-
ical state that is different from that in which they exist as
a contaminant, making use of a chemical action between the
contaminant and the decontaminant . The use of water, steam-
cleaning, scrubbing, complexing agents, organic solvents,
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